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ARTICLES
BATHROOM LAWS AS STATUS CRIMES
Stephen Rushin* & Jenny Carroll**
A growing number of American jurisdictions have considered laws that
prohibit trans individuals from using bathroom facilities consistent with their
gender identities. Several scholars have criticized these so-called “bathroom
laws” as a form of discrimination in violation of federal law. Few scholars,
though, have considered the criminal justice implications of these proposals.
By analyzing dozens of proposed bathroom laws, this Article explores how
many laws do more than stigmatize the trans community—they effectively
criminalize it. Some of these proposed laws would establish new categories
of criminal offenses for trans individuals who use bathrooms consistent with
their gender identity. Others would transform bathroom use by trans
individuals into an unlawful trespass. The existing literature suggests that
the criminal justice system is unprepared to handle this newfound
responsibility.
This Article concludes that, by effectively criminalizing noncriminal
conduct so inextricably linked to the status of being trans, some proposed
bathroom laws may violate the Eighth Amendment’s bar on cruel and
unusual punishment.
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INTRODUCTION
In January of 2017, “[o]ver loud boos” from protesters outside the senate
chamber, Texas Lieutenant Governor Dan Patrick and State Senator Louis
Kolkhorst introduced the “Women’s Privacy Act.”1 The bill would overturn
local municipal ordinances that permit trans2 individuals to use bathroom
facilities consistent with their gender identities and would designate
bathrooms in public buildings “for use by people ‘according to their
biological sex.’”3 According to Patrick, the legislation is designed not to
harm the trans community, but to protect women and children from “abuse[,]
attack[s], and assault[s] . . . by sexual predators.”4
In response, LGBTQ advocates in Texas and across the country have
sounded the alarm. They have argued that the bill is yet another attempt to
1. See Chuck Lindell, Dan Patrick Unveils Texas Transgender Bathroom Bill, AUSTIN
AM.-STATESMAN (Jan. 5, 2017, 3:03 PM), http://www.statesman.com/news/dan-patrickunveils-texas-trans-bathroom-bill/aC1uoDoDysOLYW0MwVFWQO
[https://perma.cc/
6MN6-9HSM] (explaining how the law would overturn local ordinances and leave it to each
individual business to decide who can use which bathroom, while also limiting trans bathroom
use in public universities, schools, and government buildings); Jason Whitely, Lt. Governor
Rebrands Texas’ ‘Bathroom Bill,’ KHOU (Oct. 21, 2016, 5:35 AM), http://www.khou.com/
news/politics/lt-gov-patrick-rebrands-texas-bathroom-bill/339659250
[https://perma.cc/5YUZ-3KBJ] (describing the Act as the “Women’s Privacy Act”). See
generally Privacy Protection Act, S.B. 6, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017).
2. This Article uses the term “trans” as shorthand for “transgender” to be more inclusive
to the wide variety of gender identities that fall under the broader umbrella of the term
transgender. The term transgender itself is meant to describe a wide range of “people whose
gender identity and/or gender expression differs from what is typically associated with the sex
they were assigned at birth.” Glossary of Terms—Transgender, GLAAD MEDIA REFERENCE
GUIDE, http://www.glaad.org/reference/transgender [https://perma.cc/37E3-ZP44] (last
visited September 21, 2017). The term transgender itself is often a “contested term that is
defined differently by medical professionals, advocates, social scientists, and . . . transgender
people.” Rebecca L. Stotzer, Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Personnel Interactions
with Transgender People in the United States: A Literature Review, 19 AGGRESSION &
VIOLENT BEHAV. 263, 264 (2014). The term sometimes includes other subgroups of people,
including “people with intersex conditions or some disorders of sexual development,
dragkings/queens, cross-dressers, genderqueers, [and] gender non-conforming people,” and it
may “include people who may or may not identify themselves as transgender but may present
in ways that are not consistent with their gender.” Id. This Article also uses the gender-neutral
pronouns “they,” “their,” and “theirs” to refer to trans individuals.
3. Lindell, supra note 1.
4. Lauren McGaughy, Texas Small Businesses to Dan Patrick: Back Off Promise to Pass
Transgender
Bathroom
Bill,
DALL. MORNING NEWS
(Oct.
25,
2016),
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/lgbt/2016/10/25/texas-small-businesses-dan-patrickback-promise-pass-transgender-bathroom-bill [https://perma.cc/Q3EV-L472].
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stigmatize the LGBTQ community in violation of federal law.5 Texas is
hardly alone in proposing such a controversial measure. With Patrick and
Kolkhorst’s announcement, Texas joined a growing list of jurisdictions that
have considered or enacted so-called “bathroom bills” since 2013,6 including
Alabama,7 Arizona,8 Colorado,9 Florida,10 Illinois,11 Indiana,12 Kansas,13

5. Id. (noting that Chuck Smith, the CEO of LGBTQ rights group Equality Texas, called
this measure “legislation to discriminate against LGBT Texans”). LGBTQ advocates also
point to the joint “Dear Colleague” letter sent out by the Obama administration’s Department
of Justice and Department of Education, explaining that these sorts of measures constitute a
violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. See Dear Colleague Letter on
Transgender Students from Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t
of Educ. & Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. for Civil Rights, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice (May 13, 2016), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague201605-title-ix-transgender.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Q2J-L8YP]. It is also worth noting that
Lieutenant Governor Patrick is no stranger to this sort of controversy, as he has a long history
of taking anti-LGBTQ positions. For instance, after reality television star Phil Robertson of
A&E’s Duck Dynasty compared homosexuality to bestiality, Patrick claimed that God was
speaking through Robertson. See Eric Nicholson, Lt. Guv Hopeful Dan Patrick on “Duck
Dynasty” Star’s Anti-Gay Rant: “God Is Speaking to Us,” DALL. OBSERVER (Dec. 19, 2013,
3:59
PM),
http://www.dallasobserver.com/news/lt-guv-hopeful-dan-patrick-on-duckdynasty-stars-anti-gay-rant-god-is-speaking-to-us-7114812 [https://perma.cc/G9L2-J9HZ].
6. See Joellen Kralik, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, “Bathroom Bill”
Legislative Tracking (Apr. 12, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/-bathroom-billlegislative-tracking635951130.aspx [https://perma.cc/5QYC-QDPM] (providing a detailed
list of “bathroom bills” from 2013 through January 2017).
7. See S. 1, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2017) (requiring bathrooms open to the public to
be segregated by “gender” or be manned by an attendant and establishing criminal and civil
penalties).
8. See S. 1045, 51st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2013) (voiding local ordinances that may
protect trans bathroom use and preventing any state subdivision from enacting laws that may
penalize persons who deny trans individuals access to bathrooms consistent with their gender
identity).
9. See H.R. 1081, 70th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2015) (permitting restriction
of access to sex-segregated locker rooms based on biological sex).
10. See H.R. 583, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2015) (requiring individuals to use public
restrooms based on biological sex and providing both criminal penalties and a private cause
of action).
11. See H.R. 4474, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2016) (requiring sex-segregated
bathrooms, overnight facilities, and changing rooms in school facilities and requiring students
to use facilities based on sex “determined by an individual’s chromosomes and identified at
birth by that individual’s anatomy”).
12. See S. 35, 119th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2016) (requiring single-sex
bathroom facilities in schools and providing criminal penalties for trans individuals who use
bathrooms inconsistent with their gender identities).
13. See H.R. 2737, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2016) (requiring sex-segregated bathroom
and locker room facilities in public schools and giving students a private cause of action to
collect up to $2500 from opposite-sex individuals they encounter in bathroom or locker room
facilities); S. 513, 2016 Leg., Reg Sess. (Kan. 2016).
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Kentucky,14 Louisiana,15 Michigan,16 Minnesota,17 Mississippi,18
Missouri,19 Nevada,20 New York,21 North Carolina,22 Oklahoma,23 South

14. See S. 76, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2015) (mandating the use of sexsegregated restrooms, locker rooms, and shower facilities in public schools and providing for
“best available accommodation” for trans students).
15. See S. 3895, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2016) (requesting that the State of Louisiana
take no action to comply with the Dear Colleague letter issued by the Department of Education
and the Department of Justice in May 2016).
16. See S. 993, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2016) (requiring restrooms, locker rooms,
and shower rooms in public schools to be designated for use based on students’ biological
sex).
17. See H.R. 3396, 89th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2016) (stating that “[n]o claim of
nontraditional identity or ‘sexual orientation’ may override another person’s right of privacy
based on biological sex in such facilities as restrooms, locker rooms, dressing rooms, and other
similar places, which shall remain reserved for males or females as they are biologically
defined” and applying this mandate to employers and public schools).
18. See H.R. 1523, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2016) (mandating that the state
government will not take any “discriminatory action” against a person for establishing “sexspecific standards or policies concerning employee or student dress or grooming, or
concerning access to restrooms, spas, baths, showers, dressing rooms, locker rooms, or other
intimate facilities or settings”).
19. See S. 720, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016) (establishing that in all
settings where a “student may be in a state of undress in the presence of other students,”
distinct areas must be designated for students to use according to their “biological sex” and
also applying this same standard to restrooms, locker rooms, shower rooms, and other similar
accommodations); H.R. 1339, 98th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015) (prohibiting state
revenues from being used to “create a gender-neutral environment in a previously genderdivided environment” except in cases of federal or state court order); H.R. 1338, 98th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015) (requiring all public restrooms, except single-occupancy
restrooms, to be designed as “gender-divided”).
20. See Assemb. 375, 78th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2015) (requiring public
schools to designate restrooms, locker rooms, showers, and areas where students may undress
for use by students according to their biological sex, as determined at birth).
21. See Assemb. 10127, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2016) (establishing that restrooms
and changing facilities at educational institutions be segregated by “biological sex” as
identified on a person’s birth certificate).
22. See H.R. 2, 2016 Gen. Assemb., 2d Extra Sess. (N.C. 2016) (requiring that all
multiple-occupancy bathrooms in public schools and public buildings be sex-segregated and
designated for use by individuals according to their biological sex).
23. See S. 1619, 55th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2016) (defining “sex” as the “physical
condition of being male or female, as identified at birth by that individual’s anatomy,” and
providing students with a right to religious accommodation and a private right of action in
cases where a school or district permits individuals of the opposite sex to use the same
restrooms, changing facilities, or showers).

2017]

BATHROOM LAWS AS STATUS CRIMES

5

Carolina,24 South Dakota,25 Tennessee,26 Virginia,27 Washington,28 and
Wisconsin.29 Even individual cities like Oxford, Alabama,30 have passed
bathroom ordinances targeting trans individuals, while others, like Lufkin
and Rockwall, Texas, have considered similar measures.31
The issue of trans bathroom access grew in prominence after the Obama
administration issued an administrative finding that trans students are entitled
under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 197232 to use bathrooms
consistent with their gender identities.33 Failure to provide such access to
bathroom facilities, the Obama administration argued, constituted a form of

24. See H.R. 3012, 122d Sess., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2017) (barring local governments from
enacting any laws that would permit trans individuals from using bathroom or changing room
facilities inconsistent with their biological sex as stated on their birth certificate in any “public
accommodation or a private club or other establishment”).
25. See H.R. 1008, 91st Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2017) (requiring “[e]very restroom,
locker room, and shower room located in a public elementary or secondary school that is
designated for” multiple occupancy to be used “only by students of the same biological sex”
and providing that trans students are entitled to “reasonable accommodation[s]” like the use
of a single-occupancy bathroom so long as it does not pose an undue hardship on the district).
26. See S. 2387, 109th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2016) (requiring students to use
bathrooms and locker facilities consistent with their sex as indicated on their “original birth
certificate”); H.R. 2414, 109th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2016).
27. See H.D. 1612, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2017) (mandating that all government
buildings will restrict access to bathrooms based on sex as defined by “an individual’s original
birth certificate”; requiring parental notification by schools in cases where a minor requests
“to be recognized or treated as the opposite sex, to use a name or pronouns inconsistent with
the child’s sex, or to use a restroom or changing facility designated for the opposite sex”; and
providing a civil cause of action against the government in cases where a trans person is found
to have accessed a bathroom inconsistent with their biological sex at birth).
28. See H.R. 1011, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017) (altering existing
nondiscrimination law to remove protections for trans individuals using bathrooms, locker
rooms, showers, saunas, and other comparable facilities in accordance with their gender
identities).
29. See Assemb. 469, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2015) (requiring school boards to
designate restrooms and changing rooms in public school buildings for the exclusive use of
only one sex as defined “by an individual’s chromosomes and identified at birth by that
individual’s anatomy” and further establishing a process for students to receive declaratory
relief, injunctive relief, or civil damages in cases of schools failing to follow this law).
30. See Zach Tyler, Oxford Council Rebukes Target Bathroom Policy with New
Ordinance, ANNISTON STAR (Apr. 27, 2016), http://www.annistonstar.com/news/oxfordcouncil-rebukes-target-bathroom-policy-with-new-ordinance/article_e52d109e-0c13-11e6b99a-135eb2794347.html [https://perma.cc/WLN3-5JRD] (explaining how the city of Oxford,
Alabama, unanimously approved a municipal ordinance that requires individuals to use public
restrooms that correspond to the gender listed on their birth certificates and established
criminal and civil penalties for violation of the statute).
31. See Nico Lang, Could Texas Become the Next Trans Bathroom Battleground?,
ADVOC. (May 2, 2016), http://www.advocate.com/transgender/2016/5/02/could-texasbecome-next-trans-bathroom-battleground [https://perma.cc/FQ9R-BHHX] (detailing the
contemplated ordinances in each city); see also Ray Leszcynski, Update: Rockwall Ordinance
on Bathroom Use by Person’s Sex at Birth Fails in City Council, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Apr.
29, 2016), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/news/2016/04/29/rockwall-enters-nationaldebate-on-transgender-bathroom-use-with-monday-vote
[https://perma.cc/BTA7-73AB]
(describing how the measures in Lufkin and Rockwall ultimately failed).
32. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
33. See generally Lhamon & Gupta, supra note 5.
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sex discrimination.34 In response, thirteen states filed suit against the federal
government arguing that the Obama administration overstepped its authority
in issuing such an administrative ruling.35 The U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari in one such case: Gloucester County School Board v. G.G.36 In
Gloucester, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals deferred to the Department
of Education’s interpretation of Title IX on trans bathroom use.37 The
Gloucester School Board’s decision to appeal the ruling was met with
condemnation by civil rights groups.38 On March 6, 2017, in light of the
Trump administration’s decision to rescind this Obama-era guidance letter,
the Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit
for further consideration—leaving for another day the fate of trans student
bathroom rights under Title IX.39
It is safe to say that, in only a few short years, trans bathroom use has
emerged as a divisive political issue. Thus far, the literature on bathroom
bills has focused on three major topics. One strand of the debate has focused
on whether these measures violate existing federal law.40 Another strand of
research has attempted to evaluate whether bathroom bills are actually
necessary to protect public safety as supporters contend.41 A final strand of
research and reporting has evaluated the financial ramifications of bathroom
bills.42
This Article interjects into this rapidly evolving debate to explore an
undertheorized issue related to bathroom laws—their criminal justice
34. See id. at 2 (“A School’s Title IX obligation to ensure nondiscrimination on the basis
of sex requires schools to provide transgender students equal access to educational programs
and activities . . . .”).
35. See Erik Eckholm & Alan Blinder, Federal Transgender Bathroom Access Guidelines
Blocked by Judge, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.nyti.ms/2k9q8qA
[https://perma.cc/7AX3-5UGC] (clarifying that the states challenged the Obama
administration guidance on both Title IX compliance and compliance with Title VII, which
governs civil rights in the workplace).
36. 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016).
37. See id. at 721; Jonathan H. Adler, Supreme Court to Hear Transgender Bathroom
Case, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2016/10/28/supreme-court-to-hear-transgender-bathroom-case/
[https://perma.cc/YU8D-BV25].
38. See Louis Llovio, Gloucester County School Board Requests Full Appeals Court
Review of Transgender Ruling, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Apr. 22, 2016),
http://www.richmond.com/news/virginia/article_fffed187-0d52-58db-9ee11414a6414b93.html [https://perma.cc/Q77V-CN2Q] (describing the unanimous decision by
the school board to appeal the Fourth Circuit’s decision).
39. See Ed Whelan, Supreme Court Vacates Fourth Circuit Transgender Ruling, NAT’L
REV. (Mar. 6, 2017, 10:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/445519/
supreme-court-vacate-remand-transgender [https://perma.cc/LVK3-JT6R].
40. See infra Part I.
41. See Whelan, supra note 39 (explaining that, contrary to claims made by supporters of
bathroom bills, there exists virtually no evidence to suggest that sexual predators have taken
advantage of nondiscrimination ordinances to commit crimes in public restrooms).
42. Id. (discussing preliminary estimates of the economic impact of North Carolina House
Bill 2—the state law that strictly limited trans bathroom use, stripped the state
nondiscrimination ordinance, and barred localities from enacting nondiscrimination
ordinances protecting LGBTQ residents—and discussing the estimated economic impact of a
similar proposed bill in Texas).
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implications. This Article argues that some proposed measures have the
potential to do more than stigmatize the trans community. Bathroom laws
could effectively criminalize the trans community. Some of these proposed
laws create new categories of criminal offenses for trans individuals who use
bathrooms consistent with their gender identities. Those proposals that do
not establish new crime categories may nevertheless open the door for local
police and prosecutors to classify trans bathroom use under existing criminal
statutes such as criminal trespass. In the process, they invite law enforcement
officers to use the tools of the criminal justice system to enforce these
measures.
This criminalization of the trans community creates multiple dilemmas in
the criminal justice arena. First, bathroom laws saddle local law enforcement
with the unfamiliar responsibility of identifying and policing members of the
trans community. The existing literature suggests that American police are
largely untrained and poorly equipped to enforce bathroom laws.43 Few
departments appear to have clearly articulated policies for identifying,
booking, searching, or properly housing trans suspects—and those that do
tend to be in jurisdictions without bathroom laws.44 Second, even in cases
where police officers choose not to enforce bathroom laws, the mere
existence of bathroom laws could create a sort of moral panic that may
empower members of the public to engage in dangerous attempts at private
enforcement.45
Apart from their potentially discriminatory motivations and stigmatizing
effect, these measures may expose the trans community to serious physical
and emotional harm as unprepared law enforcement and private citizens are
thrust into the role of policing public bathroom use. By encouraging police
officers and the public to police the trans community, bathroom laws increase
the probability of police misconduct and private violence directed at an
already disadvantaged minority group.
Finally, this Article argues that criminalizing bathroom use, whether by
the creation of new statutes or the use of existing ones, effectively
criminalizes the status of being trans. By criminalizing innocent, lifesustaining conduct so inextricably linked to the status of being trans, some
proposed bathroom laws may violate the Eighth Amendment’s bar on cruel
and unusual punishment.
In Robinson v. California,46 the Supreme Court held that while states may
regulate behavior through criminal law, the Eighth Amendment prevents
states from criminalizing one’s mere status.47 Six years later, in Powell v.
Texas,48 the Court seemed to back away from Robinson, declining to hold
that it was unconstitutional to criminalize acts linked to a particular status.49
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.B.2.
See infra Part II.D.
370 U.S. 660 (1962).
See infra Part III.A.
392 U.S. 514 (1968).
Id. at 536–37.
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Nonetheless, at least five of the Justices appeared sympathetic to the notion
that the Constitution may impose limits on the ability of states to punish
conduct rendered effectively involuntary by a defendant’s circumstances or
status.50
In the years since Robinson and Powell, scholars have debated whether any
conduct can be so inextricably linked to a person’s status as to make the
punishment of that conduct impermissible under the Eighth Amendment.51
Regulation of bathroom use by trans individuals brings this debate to a head.
When states seek to regulate the biological and necessary bodily functions of
trans individuals through bathroom laws, this Article argues, it seeks to
regulate their very existence.52
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the emergence of the
modern bathroom bill. This Part describes the Obama administration’s
executive guidance on trans students’ use of bathrooms in public schools. It
then tracks the thirteen state attorneys general that have filed suit against the
federal government to overturn President Obama’s executive guidance on
this issue. Next, it surveys a number of proposed state measures that would
regulate public bathroom use by trans individuals. Part II addresses the
criminal justice implications of bathroom laws. This part demonstrates how
some bathroom proposals would explicitly or implicitly criminalize
bathroom use by trans individuals and how many bathroom provisions would
grant largely untrained police officers the discretion to enforce these new
mandates, thereby increasing the chances of physical and emotional abuse of
trans individuals. Part III then considers avenues for future legal challenges
to these proposed bathroom bills, focusing specifically on the theory that
some of these measures violate the Eighth Amendment’s bar on cruel and
unusual punishment.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF THE BATHROOM BILL
Bathroom bills are a relatively recent legislative priority. There are few
records of state legislators proposing bathroom bills before 2013. Since then,
the popularity of such measures has progressively picked up steam. What
started as a single proposal in 2013 ballooned into nine in 2015, nineteen in
2016, and many more in 2017.53 The emergence of the bathroom bill at the
state level roughly coincided with a handful of cases in which trans students
secured the right to use bathroom facilities consistent with their gender

50. Id.
51. See infra Part III.B.
52. At least some courts have found that states and localities may not criminalize innocent,
life-sustaining conduct that is only made criminal by a person’s status. For example, as
discussed in Part III.B, in Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated
after settlement, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit found that a municipal
ordinance that criminalized behaviors like sitting or sleeping in public effectively punished
the status of being homeless in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Using similar logic, this
Article illustrates how litigants could challenge criminal penalties imposed on bathroom use
by trans individuals under the Eighth Amendment. See infra Part III.
53. See Kralik, supra note 6.
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identities.54 That same year, “educators in Massachusetts, Maine and
Portland, Oregon issued guidelines to accommodate trans students, allowing
them to use bathrooms and play on sports teams corresponding to the gender
with which they identify.”55
The emergence of bathroom bills also roughly coincided with the
proliferation of local nondiscrimination ordinances protecting trans
individuals.56 Opponents have argued that nondiscrimination protections
that include the trans community would open the door for “predators” to
sneak into women’s restrooms under the guise of being trans.57
The Obama administration’s “Dear Colleague” letter, issued jointly by the
Department of Justice and the Department of Education, may have
That administrative
accelerated the rise of bathroom legislation.58
guidance,59 issued on May 13, 2016, stated that Title IX requires schools to
treat trans students the same as “other students of the same gender identity.”60
Specifically, the Obama administration interpreted the prohibition on
discrimination “on the basis of sex” in “any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance” under Title IX61 to “encompass
discrimination based on a student’s gender identity, including discrimination
54. In particular, bathroom bills seemed to coincide with a landmark case in Colorado in
which a six-year-old trans girl won the right to use the girls’ restroom at her public school. See
Dan Frosch, Dispute on Transgender Rights Unfolds at a Colorado School, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
18,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/18/us/in-colorado-a-legal-dispute-overtransgender-rights.html [https://perma.cc/KDF9-NQUF] (describing the backstory of the case
and other less publicized but factually similar cases); New Documentary Highlights Landmark
Trans Bathroom Fight, WNYC (Jan. 13, 2017), http://www.wnyc.org/story/
growing-coy-documents-landmark-transgender-bathroom-fight/
[https://perma.cc/6SXGD955] (describing the case as “one of the first in the U.S. to specifically address transgender
bathroom rights” and describing Mathis’s victory as a “landmark win” that “continues to
resonate today”).
55. Sabrina Rubin Erdely, About a Girl: Coy Mathis’ Fight to Change Gender, ROLLING
STONE (Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/about-a-girl-coy-mathisfight-to-change-change-gender-20131028 [https://perma.cc/Z2UG-9KHY].
56. According to the Human Rights Campaign, at least 225 cities have local ordinances
that prohibit discrimination based on gender identity. See Cities and Counties with NonDiscrimination Ordinances That Include Gender Identity, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (Jan. 28,
2016),
http://www.hrc.org/resources/cities-and-counties-with-non-discriminationordinances-that-include-gender [https://perma.cc/4MFM-C3Q4].
57. One of the most egregious examples of this was the response to the Houston Equal
Rights Ordinance. While the ordinance prohibited discrimination on the basis of fifteen
different traits, including being trans, the opposition attacked the bill’s protection of trans
individuals. The opponents, who went by the name Campaign for Houston, ran a highly
transphobic ad that warned voters of how predators could use the statute to lawfully prey on
women and girls in public restrooms. See J. Bryan Lowder, This Anti-HERO Ad Is the
Definition of Transphobia, SLATE (Oct. 19, 2015, 4:01 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/
outward/2015/10/19/hero_trans_bathroom_battle_campaign_for_houston_ad_is_most_trans
phobic_yet.html [https://perma.cc/LSF4-R8MN].
58. See Lhamon & Gupta, supra note 5, at 1.
59. It is worth mentioning that the Department of Education and the Department of Justice
“determined that this letter [was] significant guidance” meaning that it “provides information
and examples to inform recipients about how the Departments evaluate whether covered
entities are complying with their legal obligations.” Id.
60. Id. at 2 (explaining the scope of Title IX).
61. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
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based on a student’s transgender status.”62 This finding had implications for
a number of school-related policies. In addition to ensuring trans students’
equal access to bathroom facilities consistent with their gender identities, the
agencies advised schools that they had a responsibility to “provide a safe and
nondiscriminatory environment for all students, including transgender
students”;63 to treat students consistent with their gender identities regardless
of whether they have been able to obtain identification documents reflecting
their gender identities;64 and to permit trans students to participate in sexsegregated activities and to access facilities consistent with their gender
identities.65
The Obama administration’s broad interpretation of Title IX’s prohibition
on sex discrimination is consistent with the interpretation of statutory terms
like “sex” and “gender” by previous federal courts.66 It is also consistent
with the interpretation of other federal agencies during that administration.67
62. Lhamon & Gupta, supra note 5, at 1.
63. Id. at 2 (explaining that schools were under an obligation to respond to harassment
that might create a hostile educational environment).
64. Id. at 3.
65. Id. at 3–4 (listing restrooms, locker rooms, athletics, single-sex classes, single-sex
schools, social fraternities or sororities, and housing and other overnight accommodations as
examples of areas where schools were obligated to treat trans students the same as cisgender
students).
66. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998)
(“[S]tatutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable
evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our
legislators by which we are governed. Title VII prohibits ‘discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . .
sex’ in the ‘terms’ or ‘conditions’ of employment. Our holding that this includes sexual
harassment must extend to sexual harassment of any kind that meets the statutory
requirements.” (alterations in original) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012))); Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989) (explaining that “[i]n the specific context of sex
stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive,
or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender”); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312,
1317 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Accordingly, discrimination against a transgender individual because
of her gender-nonconformity is sex discrimination, whether it’s described as being on the basis
of sex or gender.”); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Sex
stereotyping based on a person’s gender non-conforming behavior is impermissible
discrimination, irrespective of the cause of that behavior.”); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust
Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215–16 (1st Cir. 2000) (interpreting federal law defining “sex” to bar
discrimination based on sex stereotyping); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201–02 (9th
Cir. 2000) (finding an actionable claim for sex discrimination under the Gender Motivated
Violence Act when a perpetrator’s actions stemmed from the belief that a victim was a man
but failed to act like one).
67. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP’T & TRAINING ADMIN., TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT
GUIDANCE LETTER NO. 37-14, UPDATE ON COMPLYING WITH NONDISCRIMINATION
REQUIREMENTS: DISCRIMINATION BASED ON GENDER IDENTITY, GENDER EXPRESSION AND SEX
STEREOTYPING ARE PROHIBITED FORMS OF SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKFORCE
DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM (2015) (interpreting Title I of the Workforce Innovation and
Opportunity Act to prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity, gender expression,
and sex stereotyping); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OFFICE OF JOB CORPS, JOB CORPS PROGRAM
INSTRUCTION NOTICE NO. 14-31, ENSURING EQUAL ACCESS FOR TRANSGENDER APPLICANTS
AND STUDENTS TO THE JOB CORPS PROGRAM 1 (2015) (“[S]taff at Job Corps centers should
treat transgender individuals with the same respect as any other applicant or student, provide
equal opportunity, and ensure a safe and productive environment for all Job Corps youth.”);
Memorandum from Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., to U.S. Attorneys (Dec. 15, 2014),
https://www.justice.gov/file/188671/download [https://perma.cc/CU3W-SPXL].
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Conservative legislators across the country reacted angrily to the Obama
administration’s guidance on trans bathroom access.68 At least thirteen states
filed suit against the federal government claiming that the Obama
administration overstepped its authority in issuing such an administrative
ruling.69
Not long after the Obama administration published its guidance letter, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Gloucester County School Board v.
G.G.70 There, G.G, a trans boy, sought to use the boys restroom at his high
school.71 The local school board then passed a policy banning G.G. from
using the boys restroom.72 G.G. filed suit against the school district alleging
a violation of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.73
The district court dismissed G.G.’s suit and denied a preliminary injunction
before the Fourth Circuit reversed.74
The Fourth Circuit ultimately deferred to the Department of Education’s
interpretation of Title IX on trans bathroom use.75 The Gloucester School
Board’s decision to appeal the ruling was met with condemnation by civil
rights groups.76 On March 6, 2017, in light of the Trump administration’s
decision to rescind this Obama-era guidance letter, the Court ultimately
vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit for further
consideration.77 Some may reasonably argue that the Gloucester case was
more about deference to agency interpretations of the law than trans rights.
Nevertheless, the case further ignited the heated national debate over the
proper regulation of trans bathroom use.
Regardless of the origins of the bathroom bill, it is clear that these
potentially discriminatory proposals have grown in popularity in recent years.
Between 2013 and 2016, at least twenty-four states considered laws that
would restrict trans “access to multiuser restrooms, locker rooms, and other
sex-segregated facilities.”78 At least nine of these recent proposals have
focused specifically on limiting trans bathroom access in public schools.79

68. See Emanuella Grinberg, Feds Issue Guidance on Transgender Access to School
Bathrooms, CNN (May 14, 2016, 3:48 AM) (quoting former North Carolina Governor Patrick
McCrory, Tennessee Senator Lamar Alexander, Mississippi Governor Phil Bryant, and Texas
Senator Ted Cruz expressing various degrees of disagreement with and outrage over the
Obama administration’s order), http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/12/politics/transgenderbathrooms-obama-administration/ [https://perma.cc/Q575-LLAK].
69. See Eckholm & Blinder, supra note 35.
70. 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016).
71. Id. at 715–16.
72. Id. at 714–15.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 715.
75. Id.; Adler, supra note 37.
76. See Llovio, supra note 38.
77. See Whelan, supra note 39.
78. Kralik, supra note 6.
79. See supra notes 7–29 (showing that Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Nevada,
South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wisconsin appear to limit their bathroom bills only to public
school facilities).
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The rest have included some generally applicable limitations on bathroom
use in government buildings or public businesses.80
The Department of Education and the Department of Justice under the
Trump administration rescinded the Obama administration’s guidance on
trans bathroom use in public schools,81 effectively leaving it up to individual
states to decide whether to permit trans students to use facilities consistent
with their gender identities. This act has not appeared to stem the growing
push by state legislators to regulate trans bathroom use. In the 2017
legislative session alone, legislators in seven states—Alabama, Kansas,
Minnesota, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and Washington—have
proposed bills that would restrict trans access to bathrooms.82
Limited scholarship on bathroom bills exists, and there is virtually no
literature on the criminal justice implications of bathroom bills. A handful
of scholars have argued that existing laws protect the ability of trans
individuals to use bathrooms consistent with their gender identities. For
example, advocates have argued for the use of existing disability law83 or
employment law84 to protect trans individuals from discrimination. Others
have crafted constitutional and statutory objections to laws that deny trans
individuals equal access to bathroom facilities.85
Another group of scholars and media outlets have challenged claims that
trans bathroom use poses a safety risk. Some scholars, like Robin Fretwell
Wilson, have persuasively argued that trans individuals pose no safety threat
when using bathroom facilities consistent with their gender identities.86
80. See supra notes 7–29 (showing the wide range of laws that exist, with some explicitly
criminalizing trans bathroom use as discussed in Part II, and others giving private individuals
a civil right of action to enforce limitations on trans access to bathroom facilities). For
example, legislators in Florida, Kansas, Virginia, and Wisconsin have proposed measures that
would give private individuals the right to pursue private causes of action in cases where a
trans person is allowed to use a bathroom facility consistent with their gender identity. See
supra notes 7–29.
81. Dear Colleague Letter from Sandra Battle, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights,
U.S. Dep’t of Educ. & T.E. Wheeler II, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen. for Civil Rights, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice (Feb. 22, 2017), http://www.employmentandlaborinsider.com/wp-content/
uploads/sites/328/2017/06/BLOG.Dear-Colleague-Letter-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4Q9MRDC] (“[T]he Department of Education and the Department of Justice have decided to
withdraw and rescind the above-referenced guidance documents in order to further and more
completely consider the legal issues involved.”).
82. See supra notes 7–29.
83. See generally Daniella A. Schmidt, Bathroom Bias: Making the Case for Trans Rights
Under Disability Law, 20 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 155 (2013).
84. See generally Marvin Dunson III, Sex, Gender, and Transgender: The Present and
Future of Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 465 (2001).
85. See, e.g., Diana Elkind, The Constitutional Implications of Bathroom Access Based on
Gender Identity: An Examination of Recent Developments Paving the Way for the Next
Frontier of Equal Protection, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 895, 895 (2007) (showing how trans rights
may be the next frontier for equal protection cases); Vincent J. Samar, The Right to Privacy
and the Right to Use the Bathroom Consistent with One’s Gender Identity, 24 DUKE J. GENDER
L. & POL’Y 33, 42–58 (2016) (arguing that bathroom bills constitute sex discrimination in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Title VII, and Title IX).
86. See generally Robin Fetwell Wilson, The Nonsense About Bathrooms: How
Purported Concerns over Safety Block LGBT Nondiscrimination Laws and Obscure Real
Religious Liberty Concerns, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1373 (2017) (arguing that the
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Reports by a number of media sources have reiterated Professor Wilson’s
assertion.87
A few researchers have sought to situate trans bathroom bills within the
broader historical context of other civil rights cases. Jennifer Levi and Daniel
Redman have drawn historical parallels between “a little-known series of
cases in which courts declined to enforce cross-dressing laws against
transgender defendants” and modern laws limiting trans bathroom access.88
Jill Weinberg has compared trans bathroom usage to other historical
examples of segregation and discrimination.89
Academics and advocacy groups have argued that bathroom bills
stigmatize trans individuals in a way that may impact their health and their
ability to participate fully in public life.90 These studies build on existing

discussion over bathroom access and safety unfairly obscures more pressing and legitimate
issues about how to best balance the need for nondiscrimination for LGBTQ persons with the
need for religious liberty for houses of worship and other places where religious individuals
may have good reason to expect protection for their beliefs).
87. See, e.g., Stevie Borrello, Sexual Assault and Domestic Violence Organizations
Debunk ‘Bathroom Predator Myth,’ ABC NEWS (Apr. 22, 2016), http://abcnews.go.com/US/
sexual-assault-domestic-violence-organizations-debunk-bathroom-predator/story?id
=38604019 [https://perma.cc/MR69-QM9J] (explaining how a coalition of over 200 national,
state, and local organizations that work with sexual assault and domestic violence survivors
argued that there has been no uptick in sexual assaults in the 200 municipalities and eighteen
states where nondiscrimination laws protect trans bathroom use); Katy Steinmetz, Why LGBT
Advocates Say Bathroom ‘Predator’ Argument Is a Red Herring, TIME (May 2, 2016),
http://time.com/4314896/transgender-bathroom-bill-male-predators-argument
[https://perma.cc/VQ6H-MQXN] (citing a lack of evidence of any such harm in the dozens of
locations that have adopted comprehensive nondiscrimination laws and ordinances).
88. Jennifer Levi & Daniel Redman, The Cross-Dressing Case for Bathroom Equality, 34
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 133, 133 (2010).
89. See Jill D. Weinberg, Trans Bathroom Usage: A Privileging of Biology and Physical
Difference in the Law, 18 BUFF. J. GENDER L. & SOC. POL’Y 147, 151 (2010) (comparing the
restrictions on trans bathroom use to Jim Crow segregation laws of the South).
90. See, e.g., TIMOTHY WANG ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, STATE ANTI-TRANSGENDER
BATHROOM BILLS THREATEN TRANSGENDER PEOPLE’S HEALTH AND PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC
LIFE
1
(2016),
http://fenwayhealth.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/COM-2485Transgender-Bathroom-Bill-Brief_v8-pages.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PKA-FNTN]; Kristie L.
Seelman, Transgender Adults’ Access to College Bathrooms and Housing and the
Relationship to Suicidality, 63 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 1378, 1379 (2016) (finding a statistical
relationship between the denial of bathroom access and suicide attempts); Shoshana Goldberg
& Andrew Reynolds, The North Carolina Bathroom Bill Could Trigger a Health Crisis Among
Transgender Youth, Research Shows, WASH. POST (Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.washington
post.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/18/the-north-carolina-bathroom-bill-could-triggera-health-crisis-among-transgender-youth-research-shows
[https://perma.cc/DCY3-VBLS]
(relying in part on the results of national surveys of school climates for LGBTQ youth in high
schools and middle schools, as well as other survey data); Max Kutner, Denying Transgender
People Bathroom Access Is Linked to Suicide, NEWSWEEK (May 1, 2016),
http://www.newsweek.com/transgender-bathroom-law-study-suicide-454185
[https://perma.cc/3Y8Z-VS2W] (relying on a study from the Journal of Homosexuality that
finds increased suicide risks for respondents who have been denied access to a bathroom
because of their gender identity).
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research that suggests more generally that harassment and marginalization of
the trans community adversely affects psychological well-being.91
Outside of academia, advocates and policymakers have argued about the
economic cost of implementing highly controversial bathroom laws,92 as
well as the obvious enforcement challenges of excluding individuals from
public spaces based on their birth certificates.93
Overall, while the existing literature explores a wide range of topics related
to trans bathroom use,94 virtually no scholarship discusses its criminal justice
implications. This is a problematic oversight for several reasons. First, not
only have some states acted to exclude trans individuals from using
bathrooms consistent with their gender identities, but some state legislators
are now proposing the criminalization of such bathroom use.95 This means
that police, jails, prisons, and criminal courts could now be thrust onto the
frontlines of this emerging cultural battle. Though there is a robust literature
on the consequences of criminalization, it has not adequately considered the
impacts of such criminalization on the trans community. This is an important
consideration that legislators and civil rights advocates ought to consider as
states begin wading into this controversial subject.
Second, attempts to criminalize trans bathroom use may open up new
opportunities for advocates to challenge these measures using an alternative
91. See Seelman, supra note 90, at 1378–79 (citing multiple studies on how discrimination
and marginalization of trans and gender nonconforming people may negatively impact their
psychological well-being).
92. See, e.g., Kimberly Adams, The High Price of North Carolina’s Transgender
Bathroom Bill, MARKETPLACE (May 9, 2016), https://www.marketplace.org/2016/05/09/
business/north-carolina-transgender-bathroom-bill-comes-cost
[https://perma.cc/H92KKBWJ] (describing how the Charlotte Regional Visitors Authority estimated that the North
Carolina bathroom bill cost the city more than $80 million in lost business as of May 2016);
Corinne Jurney, North Carolina’s Bathroom Bill Flushes Away $630 Million in Lost Business,
FORBES (NOV. 3, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/corinnejurney/2016/11/03/northcarolinas-bathroom-bill-flushes-away-750-million-in-lost-business [https://perma.cc/AZG33ZRC]; David Saleh Rauf, Study: Transgender Bathroom Bill Could Cost Texas Economy
$8.5 Billion Annually, HOUS. CHRON. (Dec. 6, 2016), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/
news/politics/texas_legislature/article/Study-transgender-bathroom-bill-could-cost-the10761390.php [https://perma.cc/7UTT-D382].
93. See, e.g., Samantha Michaels, We Asked Cops How They Plan to Enforce North
Carolina’s Bathroom Law, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 7, 2016), http://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2016/04/north-carolina-lgbt-bathrooms-hb2-enforcement [https://perma.cc/CNV4V6MS] (describing the challenges that law enforcement officers face in enforcing restrictions
on bathroom access based on designations on individuals’ birth certificates).
94. Although not specifically discussed in the text above, it is worth mentioning a few
other relevant studies. Dylan Vade has argued for a reconceptualization of legal terminology
to be more inclusive of trans people. See Dylan Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding the
Law: Toward a Social and Legal Conceptualization of Gender That Is More Inclusive of
Transgender People, 11 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 253, 311 (2005). Others have emphasized the
need for protections for trans students. See Lindsay Hart, With Inadequate Protection Under
the Law, Transgender Students Fight to Access Restrooms in Public Schools Based on Their
Gender Identity, 41 N. KY. L. REV. 315, 317 (2014). Others have wondered whether the
discussion of bathroom rights is simply a diversion from more serious subjects on the path to
full inclusion for trans individuals. See, e.g., Lisa Mottet, Access to Gender-Appropriate
Bathrooms: A Frustrating Diversion on the Path to Transgender Equality, 4 GEO. J. GENDER
& L. 739, 744–46 (2002).
95. See infra Part II.
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legal avenue: the Eighth Amendment. Such a constitutional challenge could
help advocates undercut the criminal enforcement of these prohibitions on
trans bathroom use. Thus, the parts that follow make two separate
contributions to the existing literature. Part II explores the criminal justice
implications of bathroom laws. Part III then argues that the proposed state
laws that criminalize trans bathroom use effectively establish status crimes
in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s bar on cruel and unusual punishment.
II. BATHROOM LAWS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
There is a long history of limiting the application of the criminal justice
system to conduct worthy of punishment. As the Supreme Court suggested
in Lawrence v. Texas,96 it may be unreasonable to utilize the blunt instrument
of the criminal justice system “absent injury to a person or abuse of an
institution the law protects.”97 When the law designates conduct as criminal,
it has real consequences for both criminal defendants and actors within the
criminal justice system. The criminalization of conduct comes with real
costs—enforcement costs,98 processing costs,99 incarceration costs,100 and
other collateral consequences.101

96. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
97. Id. at 567. As law students often learn in their first-year criminal law courses, courts
have articulated limiting principles that prevent the punishment of otherwise seemingly
innocent acts. See Proctor v. State, 176 P. 771, 772 (Okla. Crim. App. 1918) (preventing the
State of Oklahoma from criminalizing the “keeping of a place”).
98. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV.
323, 328 (2004) (advocating for the use of cost-benefit analysis to more accurately weigh the
relative costs associated with criminal justice policy); Tom Meagher, The Costs of Crime
Fighting, MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb. 12, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/
02/12/the-cost-of-crime-fighting [https://perma.cc/5DAE-GBS4] (providing a detailed,
historical retrospective about the costs of enforcing the federal criminal law through
examining the budgets of the Department of Justice, the FBI, the U.S. Attorney’s Office, the
Marshals Service, the Bureau of Prisons, and the Office of Justice Programs).
99. See, e.g., MALCOLM FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN
A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1992) (arguing that, for misdemeanors and lesser felonies, the
most significant punishment is not the minimal fines or prison sentences but rather the costs
incurred by the defendants before the case even comes before the judge—lost wages, missed
work, bail bondsmen commissions, fees paid to attorneys, and collateral consequences); Issa
Kohler-Hausman, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 611
(2014) (arguing that the New York City justice system is focused on overseeing people rather
than handling simple adjudication).
100. See JONATHAN SIMON, MASS INCARCERATION ON TRIAL: A REMARKABLE COURT
DECISION AND THE FUTURE OF PRISONS IN AMERICA 17–47 (2014) (providing background on
the costs associated with mass incarceration in the United States from the 1970s onward);
CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & RUTH DELANEY, VERA INST., THE PRICE OF PRISONS: WHAT
INCARCERATION COSTS TAXPAYERS 1 (2012), https://shnny.org/uploads/Price-of-Prisons.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R3CD-ZNXG] (finding that in the forty states participating in the study,
incarceration frequently costs taxpayers more than is reflected in corrections budgets); Brown,
supra note 98, at 346–49 (describing the effects of incarceration on families and communities).
101. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364–65 (2010) (distinguishing between the
direct consequences of criminal convictions, like incarceration, and the “collateral”
consequences of criminal convictions, like deportation or civil action that may follow from a
criminal conviction).
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As discussed in Part I, the existing literature has not considered the
criminal justice implications of laws excluding trans individuals from certain
sex-segregated bathroom facilities. To begin filling this gap, this Part
examines legislative proposals from across the country related to trans
bathroom use. It shows how many of these bathroom bills do more than
merely exclude trans individuals from sex-segregated spaces.
As this Part demonstrates, many of these proposals would effectively
criminalize the trans community. They do this in two ways—either by
explicitly creating a new criminal offense for trans individuals who use
bathrooms consistent with their gender identity or by effectively
transforming such acts into criminal trespass. In each case, the effect is the
same. These proposals would criminalize members of the trans community
for using public restrooms. This puts local law enforcement, prison and jail
officials, and courts on the frontlines in policing trans bathroom use. As the
subparts below illustrate, these actors are largely unequipped to handle this
newfound responsibility, thus exposing the trans community to an increased
risk of physical and emotional harm.
A. Criminalizing the Trans Community:
Bathroom Use as a Crime and as a Trespass
This Part first discusses laws that treat bathroom use as a crime. It then
analyzes laws treating bathroom use as a trespass.
The most direct way that proposed bathroom laws criminalize the trans
community is by explicitly establishing a new criminal offense category for
trans individuals who use bathrooms consistent with their gender identities.
For example, Indiana Senate Bill No. 35 would make it a Class A
misdemeanor for a person who is of the “physical condition of being [one
‘biological gender’], as determined by an individual’s chromosomes and
identified at birth by the individual’s anatomy” to use a public restroom
facility designed for the other “biological gender.”102 This broad definition
of so-called “biological gender” is even more dangerous than many proposals
from other states. For one thing, this definition draws no distinction between
individuals who identify as trans, those who have begun to transition, those
who have undergone sex reassignment procedures, and those who have had
their birth certificate corrected. Under this definition, all members of the
trans community would be forced to use public facilities matching their sex
assigned at birth or face serious criminal penalties. Class A misdemeanors
are the highest misdemeanor offense category in Indiana and can result in up
to one year of incarceration and up to a $5000 fine.103
102. S. 35, 119th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2016). This Article uses the
terminology “biological gender” because this is the language used by the Indiana bill. This
does not reflect any judgment about the correctness of this terminology. This terminology is
out of step with the preferred language recommended by those in the trans community, experts,
and activists. See, e.g., Transgender Terminology, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY
(Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.transequality.org/issues/resources/transgender-terminology
[https://perma.cc/PC28-8YL3].
103. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-3-2 (West 2016).
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Similarly, Florida House Bill 583 states that “[a] person who knowingly
and willfully enters a single-sex public facility designated for or restricted to
persons of the other sex commits a misdemeanor of the second degree.”104
Under Florida law, a second-degree misdemeanor results in a “definite term
of imprisonment not exceeding 60 days”105 and up to a $500 fine.106
Other states do not clearly delineate a category of criminal offense for
violations of their bathroom proposals but do explicitly encourage law
enforcement to engage in policing. For example, Senate Bill 1 in Alabama
states that “[e]nforcement of this act shall be authorized by any state or local
law enforcement agency having jurisdiction over the person or entity
providing rest rooms, bathrooms, or changing facilities to the public.”107
While some state legislators have proposed the creation of new criminal
offense categories for trans bathroom use, most existing proposals would
merely establish prohibitions on trans bathroom access without attaching any
clear criminal penalty. This has led some commentators to conclude that, if
such a law were to pass, a trans person could not be arrested for using a
bathroom facility consistent with their gender identity.108 Unfortunately, this
conclusion is not entirely accurate. By announcing prohibitions regarding
who can lawfully access public, sex-segregated bathroom facilities, these
bathroom laws open the door for police to arrest trans individuals for criminal
trespass.
Generally, states define criminal trespass as the unlawful or unlicensed
entry or presence in a space.109 It is more difficult to charge a person with
trespassing on public property. In such cases,
when property is open to the public at the time of an alleged trespass, the
state has the burden of proving that a lawful order excluding the defendant
from the premises [was] issued, that the order was communicated to the
defendant by a person with authority to make the order, and that the
defendant defied the order.110

104. H.R. 583, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2015).
105. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082 (West 2016).
106. Id. § 775.083 (stating the fine shall not exceed “$500, when the conviction is of a
misdemeanor of the second degree or a noncriminal violation”).
107. S. 1, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2017).
108. See Michaels, supra note 93 (stating, in reference to the North Carolina law, that
“[b]ecause it’s a civil law, using the wrong bathroom wouldn’t be considered a criminal
violation in itself”).
109. See 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass § 190 (2017). Like all criminal offenses, each element
of trespass must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Some states limit the application
of criminal trespass to situations where a defendant has remained in a space after being ordered
to leave by the owner of the property or by another authorized person. See State v. Delgado,
562 A.2d 539, 544 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989). The court found that the requisite Connecticut
statute required a showing that “(1) that the defendant, knowing that he was not privileged or
licensed to do so, entered or remained in a building; and (2) that the defendant committed that
act after an order to leave or not to enter had been personally communicated to him by the
owner or other authorized person.” Id. (quoting State v. LoSacco, 529 A.2d 1348, 1350
(1987)).
110. 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass § 191 (2017).
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These sorts of limitations on the use of trespass against individuals
occupying public spaces make sense. When a particular space is open to the
public at the time of an alleged trespass, we often assume that a person has a
license or privilege to be present without penalty.111 In such cases, it is
common for the state to have a burden of showing that it communicated a
lawful order excluding the defendant from the premises, which the defendant
defied.112 Some states have limited the use of trespass in public spaces to
cases where the prosecutor can demonstrate the “additional fact” that the
defendant lacked a legal right to remain thereby protecting against capricious
or arbitrary enforcement.113 The posting of signs, the announcement of
regulations, or the use of fences and barricades can be sufficient to
demonstrate this “additional fact.”114
The majority of bathroom law proposals would seemingly open the door
for police officers to arrest some trans individuals for criminal trespass for
using bathroom facilities consistent with their gender identities. Before the
consideration of modern bathroom bills, state courts had already held that it
may constitute unlawful trespass for a person who identifies as a man to enter
a restroom facility designated exclusively for those who identify as
women.115 In such cases, courts have held that a state may permissibly
exclude individuals from public spaces and use criminal trespass to enforce
such exclusion where visible signs designated a bathroom facility for the

111. See, e.g., People v. Leonard, 465 N.E.2d 831, 834 (N.Y. 1984) (explaining that
“[w]hen the property is ‘open to the public’ at the time of the alleged trespass . . . the accused
is presumed to have a license and privilege to be present” (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.00
(McKinney 2017))).
112. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 739 P.2d 781, 783 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987) (“The jury must
find that the premises were open to the public, that Johnson was personally ordered to leave
the premises, that the person who gave the order was authorized by the owner of the premises
to give the order, and that the order was legally effective to terminate Johnson’s license or
privilege to utilize the premises.”); People v. Brown, 254 N.E.2d 755, 757 (N.Y. 1969)
(concluding that when someone “lawfully entered the premises, a conviction could be had [for
trespass] only if the prosecution established that (1) a lawful order not to remain was
personally communicated to the defendant and (2) that he defied such a lawful order”).
113. See, e.g., Hemmati v. United States, 564 A.2d 739, 745 (D.C. 1989) (“One who
remains present in a restricted area with a bona fide belief of his legal authority to remain there
is not guilty of unlawful entry.”); O’Brien v. United States, 444 A.2d 946, 948 (D.C. 1982)
(noting that the government must show “some additional specific factor establishing the
[individual’s] lack of a legal right to remain” to prove unlawful entry onto public property).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 563 A.2d 1086, 1089 (D.C. 1989); Carson v. United
States, 419 A.2d 996, 998 (D.C. 1980) (holding that factors that can demonstrate a person’s
lack of a legal right to remain include “posted regulations, signs[,] or fences and barricades
regulating the public’s use of government property”).
115. See Brief of Amici Curiae Anti-Sexual Assault, Domestic Violence, and GenderBased Violence Organizations in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Seeking Reversal at 8–9,
Carcaño v. McCrory, No. 16-1989 (4th Cir. Oct. 25, 2016), 2016 WL 6312116 (“Charlotte’s
nondiscrimination ordinance would have allowed transgender men to use men’s facilities and
transgender women to use women’s facilities. It would have remained illegal for men to
trespass in women’s restrooms, as well as to engage in a range of conduct in them.”).
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exclusive use of one gender.116 For example, in In re S.M.S.,117 the Court of
Appeals of North Carolina heard a challenge by a juvenile defendant to a
second-degree criminal trespass conviction.118 There, a school coach caught
the defendant going into the girls’ locker room. While the Court of Appeals
ultimately found that the school was more than capable of dealing with this
incident without the assistance of the criminal justice system, it did conclude
that a “sign marked ‘Girl’s Locker Room’ was reasonably likely to give
respondent notice that he was not authorized to go into the girls’ locker room,
pursuant to” the North Carolina statute.119
Similarly, in Commissioner v. White,120 a case before the Superior Court
of Pennsylvania, a man was found guilty at trial for criminal trespass for
entering a “ladies’ room” inside the Society Hill Club in Philadelphia.121 The
defendant challenged his conviction for criminal trespass, arguing that the
ladies’ room was not a “separately secured or occupied portion” of a building
as required under the Pennsylvania statute.122 In rejecting the defendant’s
argument, the court concluded that the ladies’ room was “reserved for the
exclusive use of only a subset of the total population authorized to use the
larger structure.”123 Such a holding should hardly be surprising. As one
court remarked, before trans bathroom use emerged as a divisive national
issue, “the application of the . . . trespass laws to sex-segregated bathrooms
and showers [was] straightforward and uncontroversial.”124
Without the presence of a bathroom law on the books, trans individuals
may have a reasonable argument that existing signage does not clearly
communicate which bathroom they ought to use. In such cases, it may prove
challenging for a prosecutor to use existing trespass statutes to penalize a
trans person for using a bathroom consistent with their gender identity. After
all, a trans person could simply argue that signage designating gendersegregated bathrooms does not clarify how the state defines each gender
category.
But by passing a law that explicitly clarifies which public bathroom
facilities a person may lawfully enter, a prosecutor may be able to argue that
the state has provided trans individuals with notice. Judge Thomas D.
Schroeder of the Middle District of North Carolina has agreed with this
assessment. After North Carolina passed a bill limiting trans individuals’
access to public bathroom facilities consistent with their gender identities, a
group of civil liberties organizations, trans students, and state employees
116. See, e.g., In re S.M.S., 675 S.E.2d 44, 46 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (explaining that “[t]he
sign marked ‘Girl’s Locker Room’ was reasonably likely to give respondent notice that he was
not authorized to go into the girls’ locker room” under the statute); Comm’r v. White, 538
A.2d 887, 889 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (“We hold that appellant’s entry into the ladies’ room
violated § 3503(a)(1)(i), and therefore affirm his conviction of felonious criminal trespass.”).
117. 675 S.E.2d 44 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009).
118. Id. at 44.
119. Id. at 46.
120. 538 A.2d 887, 889 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
121. Id. at 888.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 889.
124. Carcaño v. McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d 615, 629 (M.D.N.C. 2016).
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brought suit against the governor and the University of North Carolina
seeking to enjoin the law.125 While Judge Schroeder’s memorandum
opinion, order, and preliminary injunction covered significant ground, one
particular piece of his analysis is worth reproducing here. Judge Schroeder
acknowledged that limitations on access to public restroom facilities had
previously been enforced through “voluntary compliance, social mores, and
when necessary criminal trespassing law.”126
While neither party was able to point to a criminal trespass case involving
a trans individual in North Carolina, this was likely because “individuals who
dress and otherwise present themselves in accordance with their gender
identity have generally been accommodated” at least on a “case-by-case
basis.”127 By changing state law to explicitly bar trans individuals from
accessing bathrooms consistent with their gender identities, the court
concluded that the North Carolina law now means that “any person who uses
a covered facility that does not align with his or her birth certificate commits
a misdemeanor trespass.”128
Thus, this is not an imagined or hypothetical concern. By passing a
prohibition on trans bathroom access in public, North Carolina has opened
up the trans community to criminal enforcement under existing trespass
statutes. Furthermore, nothing about the North Carolina trespass statute
makes it particularly unique. Should other states follow suit and provide
limitations on trans access to public restrooms consistent with their gender
identities, these states may similarly transform harmless public bathroom use
by trans individuals into criminal trespass.
B. Police Enforcement
Bathroom law proposals that explicitly or effectively criminalize bathroom
use by trans individuals would place police officers on the frontlines of
enforcing these proposed criminal prohibitions. This Part first discusses the
long and well-documented history of police officers in the United States
mistreating the trans community.129 Modern evidence suggests that
transphobic cultures exist in many American police departments.130 This
may be, in part, because it appears that police rarely receive training in
dealing with the trans community. This Part then identifies inherent
challenges to bathroom law enforcement. Taken together, lack of training,
the history of mistreatment, and evidence of a transphobic culture suggest
that police enforcement of bathroom laws could increase the likelihood of
misconduct directed at an already disadvantaged minority group.
125. See id. at 622–25.
126. Id. at 623.
127. Id. at 624.
128. Id. at 628. The court found that multiple parties to the suit appeared to be in agreement
that the North Carolina bathroom law could be enforced using trespass statutes. See id.
129. See Noah Remick, Activists Say Police Abuse of Transgender People Persists Despite
Reforms, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/07/nyregion/
activists-say-police-abuse-of-transgender-people-persists-despite-reforms.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/VB3X-W9EQ].
130. See id.
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1. Existing Evidence on Treatment of Trans Community by
American Law Enforcement
The existing literature suggests that trans individuals already experience
an unusually high level of contact with law enforcement, even without
bathroom laws.131 At least thirteen studies since 2003 have surveyed trans
individuals about their experience with law enforcement abuse outside of a
custodial setting.132 These studies reveal a few important trends. First, there
is widespread agreement within the existing literature that trans individuals
are reluctant to go to the police when they become victims of crimes. For
example, a 2007 report by Jessica Xavier, Julie Honnold, and Judith Bradford
found that 83 percent of trans individuals victimized by sexual assault and 70
percent of those victimized by physical assault chose not to go to police.133
That report relied on a survey of 350 individuals identified through trans
support groups and informal peer networks.134 This roughly mirrors other
studies on this same subject. A 2005 survey of 265 individuals primarily in
Wisconsin found that only 9 percent of trans victims of sexual assault
reported the crime to the police.135 A 2001 survey by A. R. Sousa of fortyfour trans individuals in San Francisco, recruited through agencies serving
the trans community, found that among trans individuals that had been
victims of criminal acts, only 25 percent reported the incidents to police.136
A 1997 study by Emilia L. Lombardi and others of 402 trans individuals
across the country found that over 41 percent of victims of harassment or
violence never went to the police.137 Of course, these surveys use a wide
range of sampling methodologies—some more sophisticated than others.
Some of these studies are also geographically limited, meaning that it is
difficult to reach any generalizable conclusions from their results alone. But,
taken together, the existing body of work suggests that trans individuals are
likely more reluctant than their cisgender counterparts to turn to the criminal
justice system when they have been victims of crimes.
131. A literature review by Rebecca L. Stotzer in 2014 provides an excellent summary of
many of the existing studies. See Stotzer, supra note 2, at 272.
132. Id. at 271 (showing a list of all thirteen studies and their respective findings).
Sampling strategies for these surveys varies widely. Some use fairly reliable sampling
strategies, while others rely on snowball sampling or samples of convenience. So it is not wise
to rely on any one study as representative of the diverse lived experiences of trans individuals
from all across the United States. Id. at 265–70 (describing the sample methodologies used in
the existing studies).
133. JESSICA XAVIER ET AL., THE HEALTH, HEALTH-RELATED NEEDS, AND LIFECOURSE
EXPERIENCES OF TRANSGENDER VIRGINIANS 22 (Jan. 2007), http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/
content/uploads/sites/10/2016/01/THISFINALREPORTVol1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KNCHYJW].
134. Id. at 10–11.
135. Stotzer, supra note 2, at 268, 274 (showing the number of respondents and describing
the study’s findings thereafter).
136. See A. R. Sousa, A Victimization Study of Transgendered Individuals in San
Francisco,
California
44
(Dec.
2001)
(unpublished
M.S.
thesis),
http://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/etd_theses/2245 [https://perma.cc/5WEY-GV8E].
137. See generally Emilia L. Lombard et al., Gender Violence: Transgender Experiences
with Violence and Discrimination, 42 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 89, 96 (2001) (providing an
overview of the study and its results).
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In examining the existing literature, Rebecca Stotzer found that few studies
examined the reasons why trans individuals seem reluctant to seek police
assistance after being victimized. The few studies that did examine this
question in more depth concluded that trans people often fear discrimination
or ridicule from law enforcement or have been discouraged from contacting
police because of previous negative experiences.138
Second, and relatedly, previous studies have found that when trans
individuals do interact with police, they face a heightened risk of
discrimination and abuse. Some of the best data on this subject come from a
survey of 6450 trans and gender nonconforming individuals from all fifty
U.S. states, organized by Jaime M. Grant and others.139 That study found
significant evidence of police mistreatment. Twenty-nine percent of all trans
individuals and 46 percent of gender nonconforming individuals in the
sample reported police officers treated them with disrespect.140 Six percent
reported being physically assaulted by police, and 2 percent reported being
sexually assaulted by police.141 Further, 22 percent of all trans individuals
and 29 percent of gender nonconforming individuals in the survey reported
being harassed by police.142 All of this may explain why “[a]lmost half of
the respondents reported being uncomfortable seeking police assistance.”143
Another survey of 2376 individuals conducted by Lambda Legal found that
nearly one-third of trans and gender nonconforming individuals faced hostile
interactions with police, nearly one-quarter of trans individuals reported
being verbally assaulted by police, and a smaller but significant percentage
reported being physically assaulted or sexually harassed.144
Unfortunately, the existing literature does not definitively identify why
trans individuals appear particularly likely to become victims of police abuse.
Nevertheless, there may be reason to believe that the mistreatment of the trans
community by police stems in part from a transphobic culture common
within U.S. law enforcement. Policing scholars agree that officer misconduct
is often rooted in a department’s organizational culture.145 Research by
138. See Stotzer, supra note 2, at 275 (mentioning that trans individuals often worry that
police will not take their claims seriously).
139. See JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
TRANSGENDER
DISCRIMINATION
SURVEY
2,
158–62
(2011),
http://www.thetaskforce.org/static_html/downloads/reports/reports/ntds_full.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8KA8-TSU3].
140. See id. at 159 (finding that 37 percent of female-to-male trans individuals report
disrespect while 25 percent of male-to-female trans individuals report disrespect).
141. Id. at 160. The report also notes that the likelihood of physical or sexual assault
differed based on the race of the victim. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 162 (showing the breakdown of the levels of comfort and discomfort in seeking
help from the police).
144. LAMBDA LEGAL, PROTECTED AND SERVED? 4, 11 (2015) (showing that 32 percent of
respondents reported hostile attitudes from police, 22 percent reported being verbally
assaulted, 4 percent reported being physically assaulted, and 8 percent reported being sexually
harassed),
https://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/publications/downloads/ps_
executive-summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7KT-LP8X].
145. See Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 453, 515–25 (2004) (theorizing on the organizational roots of police
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organizational theorists has also found that socialization, on-the-job training,
and internal systems of rewards or penalties can also contribute to
misconduct.146 The link between organizational culture and misconduct is
important in the case of trans bathroom laws because police have a long
history of mistreating the trans community.147
While these studies do not suggest that police officers are incapable of
policing the trans community,148 it should give reasonable legislators some
hesitation in establishing new statutes that ensure regular (and likely hostile)
interactions between the trans community and law enforcement. Indeed,
many law enforcement officers appear to lack adequate training in how to
deal with the trans community.149 This is important because, if a police
misconduct); Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments,
99 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1417 (2015) (“[S]cholars have increasingly tied misconduct within a
police department to underlying trends in organizational culture.”); Kami Chavis Simmons,
The Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder Collaboration in the Federal Reform of Local
Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 505–06 (2008) (discussing
the organizational roots of police misconduct). Perhaps one of the most prominent examples
of this phenomenon is the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). There, investigators
connected the beating of Rodney King, in part, to “a diseased organizational culture within the
LAPD that condoned violence, tolerated racism, and failed to respond to wrongdoing.”
Rushin, supra note 45, at 1345.
146. See Diane Vaughan, The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct, and
Disaster, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 271, 290 (1999) (describing how the “willingness [of an
organizational member] to use illegitimate means on the organization’s behalf is sealed by a
reinforcing system of rewards and punishments”).
147. See CHRISTY MALLORY, AMIRA HASENBUSH & BRAD SEARS, DISCRIMINATION AND
HARASSMENT BY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS IN THE LGBT COMMUNITY 6 (2015),
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/LGBT-Discrimination-andHarassment-in-Law-Enforcement-March-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NX5-PX8G] (stating
that “[f]or decades, the LGBT community, and particularly LGBT people of color, youth, and
transgender and gender nonconforming members of the LGBT community, has been subjected
to profiling, entrapment, discrimination, harassment, and violence by law enforcement” and
discussing how the Stonewall raids specifically targeted trans and gender nonconforming
individuals); Michelangelo Signorile, Escalating Police Violence and Transgender People,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6, 2011, 9:45 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michelangelosignorile/escalating-police-violenc_b_1131343.html
[https://perma.cc/KQR4-5FQF]
(describing numerous accounts of police mistreatment of trans individuals). See generally
Kristina B. Wolff & Carrie L. Cokely, “To Protect and to Serve?”: An Exploration of Police
Conduct in Relation to the Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Community, 11
SEXUALITY & CULTURE 1 (2007) (using content analysis of incident reports in Minnesota to
examine the prevalence of negative interactions between police and the LGBT community);
Jordan Blair Woods et al., Latina Transgender Women’s Interactions with Law Enforcement
in Los Angeles County, 7 POLICING 379 (2013) (conducting semistructured interviews with
low-income Latina transgender women recruited from a community-based organization to
show that they are common victims of verbal harassment, physical assault, and sexual assault
at the hands of local law enforcement).
148. Indeed, encouraging evidence shows that the ranks of many police departments have
diversified in recent years. See David Alan Sklansky, Is the Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?, 5
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 567, 577 (2008) (“More importantly, there is a growing body of evidence
that the new diversity in the ranks is having a profound effect on the occupational culture of
policing itself. There is more division and disagreement in police forces today, more internal
debate, more factionalism, more mutual suspicion, more discord.”).
149. Abundant experiential evidence supports this notion. See, e.g., supra note 147 and
accompanying text. However, the number of police departments providing training on trans
issues remains unclear. Roughly 18,000 law enforcement departments exist in the United
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department “implicitly condone[s] wrongdoing through the use of ‘lax
supervision and inadequate investigation’ techniques,” then that department
is “more likely to see ongoing misconduct than departments that aggressively
enforce internal regulations.”150 Local law enforcement appears to have only
begun to train officers in how to deal with trans suspects. Not until 2014 did
the Department of Justice make trans cultural competency training available
to local law enforcement through its Community Relations Service.151 The
FBI did not alter its Training Manual and Hate Crime Statistics Form to
include information on trans individuals until 2012.152 Furthermore, even
though the Department of Justice has agreed to settlements related to police
misconduct153 to overhaul local police practices in at least thirty-one police
departments, it has only recently begun to include antitrans-bias training in
these agreements.154 More research is needed to evaluate the extent to which
local police departments provide adequate training related to the trans
community. The existing evidence, though, is discouraging.
2. Inherent Enforcement Challenges
The evidence from the previous subpart illustrates that the law
enforcement community is largely untrained and ill-equipped to enforce
bathroom laws. Compounding this lack of preparedness are the fundamental
enforcement challenges involved in identifying individuals violating
bathroom laws. The majority of the proposed statutes require individuals to
use bathroom facilities consistent with an individual’s biological “sex.”155
These statutes vary somewhat in how they define a person’s sex. Most define
sex at the chromosomal level,156 by the sex-designation given to a person at

States. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2008, at 2 (2011), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
csllea08.pdf [https://perma.cc/EL7D-YPFL]. The federal government keeps only limited
records on the conduct of these thousands of decentralized state and local agencies. See
Stephen Rushin, Using Data to Reduce Police Violence, 57 B.C. L. REV. 117, 118 (2016)
(“Although the federal government keeps records on everything from ‘how many people were
victims of unprovoked shark attacks . . . to the number of hogs and pigs living on farms in the
[United States], there is no reliable data on how many people are shot by police officers each
year.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Wesley Lowery, How Many Police Shootings a Year?
No One Knows, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2014/09/08/how-many-police-shootings-a-year-no-one-knows/?utm_term=.3d29
55c7242f [https://perma.cc/HYE3-5AU9])).
150. Rushin, supra note 149 (quoting Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the Department
of Justice: An Essay on Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 815, 816 (1999)).
151. HARPER JEAN TOBIN ET AL., A BLUEPRINT FOR EQUALITY: A FEDERAL AGENDA FOR
TRANS PEOPLE 25 (2015).
152. See id. at 26.
153. See 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012).
154. See TOBIN ET AL., supra note 151, at 25 (citing the New Orleans consent decree as the
first settlement of its kind “to address anti-trans bias in policing”). Notably, the President’s
task force on 21st Century Policing also recommended that police departments establish
policies to reduce bias against the LGBTQ community. Id.
155. See supra notes 7–29 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., H.R. 4474, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2016) (describing sex in part
as based on “an individual’s chromosomes”).
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birth as memorialized on their birth certificate,157 or by a person’s sexual
anatomy.158
The enforcement challenges of such an approach are obvious. These
proposed laws put police in the unenviable position of guessing the
chromosomal makeup or the sexual anatomy of private individuals entering
a public bathroom. Under Terry v. Ohio,159 a police officer would need
reasonable suspicion to conduct a limited, investigatory stop against a
civilian.160 To execute an arrest in such a situation, a police officer would
need to have probable cause that a person was using a bathroom facility
inconsistent with their chromosomal, anatomical, or otherwise designated
sex.161 In cases where a trans individual is living their life and presenting in
a manner consistent with their gender identity, it may prove practically
impossible for a police officer to meet such an evidentiary standard—
particularly given that no state could reasonably expect all persons to carry
with them a copy of original birth certificate to present on demand to a
suspicious law enforcement officer. It could also create a high risk of false
positives.162
C. Incarceration
Once police are given a license to enforce violations of bathroom laws as
crimes, the number of trans individuals who may be taken into state custody
would likely increase, at least temporarily. Evidence suggests that, once
incarcerated, trans individuals face a substantially higher risk of harassment
and physical injury than members of other groups.163 At least eight empirical
studies since 2003 have examined the lived experience of trans individuals in
custodial settings.164 These studies indicate that trans individuals face a
heightened risk of discrimination, verbal abuse, sexual harassment, physical
assault, sexual assault, and violence.165 Thirty-eight percent of trans
individuals and 29 percent of gender nonconforming individuals in the Grant
survey reported being harassed by other inmates at jail or prison facilities,
157. See, e.g., Assemb. 10127, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2016) (using a person’s birth
certificate as a distinguishing factor for sex-segregated bathrooms).
158. See, e.g., Assemb. 469, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2015) (using a person’s
“anatomy” as a means of distinguishing between male and female individuals for sexsegregated facilities).
159. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
160. Id. at 9
161. Cf. id.
162. See Stephen Rushin, The Judicial Response to Mass Police Surveillance, 2011 U. ILL.
J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 281, 302 (describing how the creation of false positives in law enforcement
investigations puts innocent individuals at risk); Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossier and the
Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1095, 1105 (2002) (explaining
how false positives “alter[] the balance of power between the government and the people,
exposing individuals to a series of harms, increasing their vulnerability and decreasing the
degree of power that they exercise over their lives”).
163. See Editorial, Prisons and Jails Put Transgender Inmates at Risk, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
9, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2jXQz2h [https://perma.cc/6WLK-CXG5].
164. See Stotzer, supra note 2, at 273–74.
165. Id.
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while an even higher percentage reported harassment by staff.166 Nineteen
percent of trans individuals and 4 percent of gender nonconforming
individuals also reported being physically assaulted by staff or inmates, while
a comparable number reported being sexually assaulted.167 A substantial
portion of trans individuals also reported a denial of healthcare while
incarcerated.168
In a study of the California correctional system, Valerie Jenness found that
59 percent of trans inmates in state custody reported being sexually
assaulted—a rate thirteen times higher than a random sample of inmates.169
A 2011 study by Pascal Emmer, Adrian Lowe, and R. Barrett Marshall
concluded that nearly half of trans individuals “had been laughed at during
the search process,” had been “put on display,” or had been “called
names.”170 Around 12 percent of respondents in that survey also reported
being physically injured on purpose.171 These results are similar to those in
a 2012 survey by Frank Galvan and Mohsen Bazargan, which found that a
significant proportion of Latina trans women taken into state custody felt they
were unfairly treated.172
D. Private Enforcement
The effective criminalization of trans bathroom use may also embolden
civilians to engage in dangerous attempts at private enforcement of bathroom
laws. Take, for example, the experience of Ebony Belcher, a trans woman
who attempted to use a bathroom inside of a grocery store in Washington,
D.C.—a district that has not even considered a ban on trans bathroom use.173
166. GRANT ET AL., supra note 139, at 166 (breaking down these numbers in the figure
entitled “Harassment in Jail/Prison by Gender”).
167. Id. at 168 (noting that 16 percent of trans individuals and 8 percent of gender
nonconforming individuals reported being sexually assaulted by either staff or other inmates).
168. See id. at 169 (showing that 14 percent of trans individuals reported a denial of
healthcare, while 20 percent reported denial of hormones).
169. See Valerie Jenness et al., Violence in California Correctional Facilities: An
Empirical Examination of Sexual Assault, U.C. IRVINE CTR. FOR EVIDENCE-BASED
CORRECTIONS (May 16, 2007), http://ucicorrections.seweb.uci.edu/files/2013/06/PREA_
Presentation_PREA_Report_UCI_Jenness_et_al.pdf [https://perma.cc/CHP6-QMJQ]. The
sample of trans individuals studied, however, was fairly small, meaning that this study should
not be viewed as representative for all incarcerated trans individuals. See id.
170. Stotzer, supra note 2, at 273 (quoting PASCAL EMMER ET AL., HEARTS ON A WIRE
COLLECTIVE, THIS IS A PRISON, GLITTER IS NOT ALLOWED: EXPERIENCES OF TRANS AND
GENDER VARIANT PEOPLE IN PENNSYLVANIA’S PRISON SYSTEMS 30 (2011),
http://socialproblems.voices.wooster.edu/files/2011/08/heartsonawire.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q795-6T2S]).
171. Id.
172. See id. (citing FRANK H. GALVAN & MOHSEN BAZARGAN, BIENESTAR HUMAN SERVS.,
INTERACTIONS OF LATINA TRANSGENDER WOMEN WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT (Apr. 2012),
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Galvan-Bazargan-InteractionsApril-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJB7-TU7T]).
173. See Jackie Bensen, Guard Charged with Assault After Confronting Transgender
Woman Using Women’s Restroom, Police Say, NBC WASH. (May 18, 2016),
http://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/Guard-Charged-with-Assault-After-ConfrontingTransgender-Woman-Using-Womens-Restroom-380010941.html [https://perma.cc/W8PRUPDR].
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Ms. Belcher’s decision to use a bathroom facility consistent with her gender
identity roused the ire of a private security guard at the store.174 When Ms.
Belcher entered the women’s restroom, the security guard followed her inside
before allegedly calling Ms. Belcher derogatory names, insisting that “[y]ou
guys cannot keep coming in here and using our women’s restroom,” and
ultimately using physical force to push Ms. Belcher—who suffers from
Parkinson’s Disease—out of the store.175
Ms. Belcher’s experience mirrors a number of recent incidents where
private citizens engaged in trans policing to exclude trans individuals from
using the restroom of their choice. In Hercules, California, three high school
boys attacked a fifteen-year-old trans boy while he used the boys’ restroom
at his school.176 Two women viciously beat and spit on Chrissy Lee Polis, a
trans woman, when she stopped to use a restroom at a McDonald’s in
Rosedale, Maryland.177 In Danbury, Connecticut, a woman mistakenly
thought another cisgender woman was trans and harassed her while she was
washing her hands in a Wal-Mart bathroom.178 While boycotting Target for
permitting trans individuals to use restrooms consistent with their gender
identities, Anita Staver, president of the evangelical Christian legal
organization Liberty Counsel, tweeted that she would be “taking a Glock .45
to the ladies room” because the weapon “identifies as [her] bodyguard.”179
And a sheriff candidate in Denton County, Texas, threatened physical
violence toward trans women who used restrooms consistent with their
gender identities.180
174. See id.
175. Id. It is worth noting that Washington, D.C. police ultimately arrested the security
guard. Id.
176. Ari Bloomekatz, Transgender Student Allegedly Attacked by Boys in School
Bathroom, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/mar/04/local/la-me-lntransgender-student-attack-bathroom-20140304 [https://perma.cc/H5AW-BTD9].
177. Jill Rosen, Victim of McDonald’s Beating Speaks Out: Transgender Woman Calls
Attack ‘Hate Crime,’ Has Been Afraid to Be Seen in Public, BALT. SUN (Apr. 24, 2011),
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-04-24/news/bs-md-mcdonalds-beating-20110423_1_
chrissy-lee-polis-transgender-woman-14-year-old-girl
[https://perma.cc/7YVE-75YQ]
(explaining the details of the case and also detailing how a three-minute video clip of the
incident appeared on YouTube shortly thereafter).
178. See Matt DeRienzo, Woman Mistaken for Trans Harassed in Walmart Bathroom,
DANBURY NEWS TIMES (May 16, 2016), http://www.newstimes.com/local/article/Womanmistaken-for-trans-harassed-in-7471666.php [https://perma.cc/5MNQ-N756] (noting that the
harasser told the other cisgender woman that she was “disgusting” and that she did not “belong
here”).
179. Curtis M. Wong, Liberty Counsel President Says She’ll Bring a Gun into Target’s
Bathroom, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 26, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/anitastaver-target-restroom_us_571fbaf3e4b0b49df6a957ed [https://perma.cc/F9K8-4SYX].
180. See Christian McPhate, Denton County GOP Sheriff Candidate Tracy Murphree Calls
for Violence Against Trans People Needing to Pee, DALL. OBSERVER (Apr. 22, 2016),
http://www.dallasobserver.com/news/denton-county-gop-sheriff-candidate-tracy-murphreecalls-for-violence-against-transgender-people-needing-to-pee-8240131
[https://perma.cc/
6EMT-EXNG] (“If my little girl is in a public women’s restroom and a man, regardless of
how he may identify, goes into the bathroom, he will then identify as a John Doe until he
wakes up in whatever hospital he may be taken to. Your identity does not trump my little
girl’s safety. I identify as an overprotective father that loves his kids and would do anything
to protect them.”).
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These are just some of the emerging examples demonstrating how, even in
the absence of enforcement by local law enforcement, bathroom bills can
encourage private enforcement. Some bathroom bills, like those in
Florida,181 Kansas,182 and Oklahoma,183 explicitly authorize private
individuals to engage in enforcement by granting civil rights of action. But
even those that do not empower individuals in such a formal way may
nevertheless contribute to vigilantism. In sociological terms, these measures
contribute to a sense of moral panic by ostracizing trans individuals as “folk
devils.”184
III. CHALLENGING BATHROOM LAWS AS STATUS CRIMES
Once we understand many of the proposed bathroom laws as either directly
or indirectly criminalizing bathroom use by trans individuals, we can turn to
the question of whether such statutes criminalize the status of being trans. In
1962, in Robinson v. California,185 the Supreme Court declared the
criminalization of a status to be a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause.186 Six years later, in Powell v. Texas,187 a
split Court limited the Robinson doctrine to the proposition that states can
criminalize voluntary conduct—even conduct linked to a status.188 In the
years that followed, the Court has resisted efforts to further clarify the
doctrine set out in Robinson and Powell. This left the lingering question
whether states may criminalize conduct that is so entwined with a status as
to be inseparable and so constitutionally indistinguishable.189
Thus, this Part argues that the Court’s decisions in Robinson and Powell
bar the criminalization of conduct that is integral to the existence of
defendants and, as such, is tantamount to criminalization of their status. Put
another way, to criminally regulate necessary biological functions is to
181. See H.R. 583, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2015).
182. See H.R. 2737, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2016).
183. See S. 1619, 55th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2016).
184. See generally STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS (1972). This
sociological and criminological classic explained how, on occasion, societies
appear to be subject . . . to periods of moral panic. A condition, episode, person or
group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and
interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass
media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other
right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and
solutions . . . .
Id. at 1. Successful moral panics often “owe their appeal to their ability to find points of
resonance with wider anxieties” within society. David Garland, On the Concept of Moral
Panic, 4 CRIME MEDIA & CULTURE 9, 12 (2008). Folk devils are often the focus of these moral
panics because they are “cultural scapegoats whose deviant conduct appalls onlookers so
powerfully precisely because it relates to personal fears and unconscious wishes.” Id. at 15.
185. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
186. See id. at 677.
187. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
188. See id. at 535.
189. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1138 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated
as moot, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the enforcement of anticamping
ordinances against the homeless could qualify as an Eighth Amendment violation when there
is no alternative shelter space available).
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criminalize existence. Just as the Court in Robinson found a California
statute criminalizing drug addiction to be constitutionally objectionable
because it criminalized the defendant’s mere existence (as opposed to his
actions), laws that criminally regulate bathroom use unconstitutionally
criminalize the existence of trans individuals.
On the most basic level, the act of going to the bathroom is “universal and
unavoidable.”190 It is both “necessary for human survival”191 and
“innocent.”192 Several of the proposed statutes offer trans individuals no
means to safely use a public bathroom. Use of a bathroom consistent with
their gender identity becomes a crime193 and use of a bathroom consistent
with their “biological sex”194 creates a risk of private violence. This risk is
particularly high in cases where a trans individual’s outward appearance is
more traditionally consistent with their gender identity than their sex assigned
at birth.
This Part considers the history of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence with
regard to status crimes. It then evaluates the divergent perspectives taken by
appellate courts in distinguishing between statuses and acts. Finally, it draws
on the language of the Ninth Circuit in Jones v. City of Los Angeles195 to
argue that the criminalization of trans bathroom use may qualify as a
violation of the Eighth Amendment.196
A. Status Crimes
Any first year law student can attest that, as a general principle, conviction
requires proof of an act or, in rare cases, an omission.197 In 1962, the
Supreme Court in Robinson considered a California statute that made it
unlawful for a person to “be addicted to the use of narcotics.”198 The Court
190. Id.
191. Statement of Interest of the United States at 12, Bell v. City of Boise, 993 F. Supp. 2d
1237 (D. Idaho 2014) (No. 1:09-cv-00540-REB).
192. See Benno Weisberg, When Punishing Innocent Conduct Violates the Eighth
Amendment: Applying the Robinson Doctrine to Homelessness and Other Contextual
“Crimes,” 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 329, 330 (2005).
193. See supra notes 7–29.
194. See Assemb. 375, 78th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2015).
195. 444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated after settlement, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007).
196. Id. at 1138.
197. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 87 (6th ed. 2012) (noting the
requirement of an act, or occasionally an omission, in defining criminal liability).
198. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 660 (1962). The statute in question stated:
No person shall use, or be under the influence of, or be addicted to the use of
narcotics, excepting when administered by or under the direction of a person
licensed by the State to prescribe and administer narcotics. It shall be the burden of
the defense to show that it comes within the exception. Any person convicted of
violating any provision of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be
sentenced to serve a term of not less than 90 days nor more than one year in the
county jail. The court may place a person convicted hereunder on probation for a
period not to exceed five years and shall in all cases in which probation in granted
require as a condition thereof that such person be confined in the county jail for at
least 90 days. In no event does the court have the power to absolve a person who
violates this section from the obligation of spending at least 90 days in confinement
in the county jail.
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confirmed that conviction requires proof of an act, concluding that
criminalization of a status alone not only runs contrary to this long-held
principle, but also violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment.199
Acknowledging that California has considerable authority to regulate
illegal drugs and collateral crime that narcotics may spawn within its borders,
the Court nonetheless struck down the statute.200 The problem with the
statute was not that it punished a drug addict but that it punished him because
he was an addict.201 The Court noted that the statute in question “makes the
‘status’ of narcotic addiction a criminal offense, for which the offender may
be prosecuted ‘at any time before he reforms.’”202 The status of being a drug
addict “may be contracted innocently or involuntarily” and would permit the
state to punish even individuals who have “never touched any narcotic drug
within the State or been guilty of any irregular behavior.”203 The Court
concluded that punishing a person under such circumstances, even if the
punishment is relatively mild, constitutes a violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.204
While the Robinson decision found statutes regulating status alone
constitutionally wanting, it also hinted at a burgeoning debate.205 First, the
Robinson Court seemed to draw a line between status—even statuses that
might be socially harmful such as narcotic addiction—and criminal law.206
Robinson acknowledged that the state could regulate narcotic addiction and
the social problems stemming from addiction in such civil realms as
healthcare, education, or social welfare, but it could not criminalize being an
addict.207 This border between crime and status, however, was limited. A
state could not criminalize the status of an addict, but California was free to
criminally regulate the manufacturing, distribution, or possession of
narcotics—even if this regulation affected addicts disproportionately or was

Id. at 660 n.1 (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721 (West 1972) (repealed 1972)).
199. Id. at 666–68.
200. Id. at 667–68. To bolster this claim, the Court cited Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S.
41 (1921), in which the Court clearly stated that states maintain the authority to exercise police
power in regulating the sale, prescription, and use of dangerous drugs.
Robinson, 370 U.S. at 664.
201. See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 666 n.3.
204. See id. at 666. The Court in Robinson also brings up other examples of possible
statuses that a state would not be permitted to punish, including mental illness and venereal
disease. This Article does not mean to suggest that the “status” of being trans is, in any way,
comparable to a disease or illness.
205. Id. at 665–66.
206. See id.
207. See id. at 666. Ironically, perhaps, some of these nonpunitive measures might result
in involuntary commitment to a treatment or mental health facility. This suggests that the
Court’s true constitutional concern with the California statute was not that it regulated
addiction or the behavior associated with it or that it produced a period of confinement based
on that regulation but that it punished Robinson for being an addict.
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the product of their addiction.208 These twin components of the Robinson
holding foreshadowed the debate to come.
Six years after Robinson, in Powell v. Texas,209 the Court revisited these
questions. Powell had been convicted of public intoxication in violation of a
Texas statute.210 At trial, Powell had claimed that “his appearance in public
[while drunk was] . . . not of his own volition” but was a product of chronic
alcoholism.211 In support of his position at trial, Powell introduced the
testimony of a psychiatrist, Dr. David Wade, who characterized Powell as “a
‘chronic alcoholic,’ who ‘by the time he has reached [the state of
intoxication] . . . is not able to control his behavior, and [who] . . . has reached
this point because he has an uncontrollable compulsion to drink.’”212 As
such, like other alcoholics, Powell was an “‘involuntary drinker,’ who [was]
‘powerless not to drink,’ and who ‘loses his self-control over his
drinking.’”213 Even in conceding that Powell’s decision to take a first drink
when sober was a “voluntary exercise of his will,” Dr. Wade added that
“these individuals have a compulsion, and this compulsion, while not
completely overpowering, is a very strong influence, an exceedingly strong
influence.”214 Powell himself testified to a long history of alcohol abuse and
public intoxication.215 The trial court was unimpressed and disallowed
Powell’s defense of chronic alcoholism.216 Nonetheless, the court entered a
defense-requested finding of fact that chronic alcoholism was a disease that
destroyed the afflicted person’s free will, including his will to avoid public
intoxication and that Powell was in fact a chronic alcoholic.217
Based on these findings, Powell argued on appeal that he did “not appear
in public by his own volition,” but rather “under a compulsion symptomatic
of the disease of chronic alcoholism.”218 As such, Powell argued, Texas’s
regulation of his public intoxication was in fact a regulation of his illness or
status as an alcoholic.219 While Texas was free to regulate the social woes
associated with alcoholism, under the Robinson decision it was not free to
criminalize Powell’s condition.220

208. See id. at 664.
209. 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (plurality opinion).
210. See id. at 517. The statute in question provided that “[w]hoever shall get drunk or be
found in a state of intoxication in any public place, or at any private house except his own,
shall be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 477 (1952)
(repealed 1973).
211. Powell, 392 U.S. at 517 (alteration in original).
212. Id. at 518 (alteration in original).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See id. at 519 (“He reviewed his many arrests for drunkenness; testified that he was
unable to stop drinking; stated that when he was intoxicated he had no control over his actions
and could not remember them later, but that he did not become violent; and admitted that he
did not remember his arrest on the occasion for which he was being tried.”).
216. See id. at 521.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See id.
220. See id.
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A four-member plurality of the Court rejected this argument,
characterizing it and the findings of fact upon which it was based as a
transparent attempt to bring Powell within the Court’s language in
Robinson.221 In distinguishing the two cases, the plurality first questioned
whether alcoholism was in fact a “status” (or more accurately, in the words
of the Court, a disease or a mere symptom of other diseases).222 Beyond this,
Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for the plurality, noted that Texas was
punishing Powell for his conduct of appearing drunk in public, rather than
for the dubious status of being an alcoholic.223 Justice Marshall wrote that
“[t]he entire thrust of Robinson’s interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause is that criminal penalties may be inflicted only if the
accused has committed some act, has engaged in some behavior, which
society has an interest in preventing . . . .”224 In Powell, the Court seemed to
jettison Robinson’s premise that social ills can and should be dealt with in
the civil realm. Instead, the plurality promoted the notion that states may
criminalize actions that are the “product” of a status that the state seeks to
control.225
Powell may have been based in part on the plurality’s unwillingness to
recognize that alcoholism was in fact a status even though the Court in
Robinson had recognized narcotic addiction as a status or illness. The Powell
plurality noted that there was no general agreement among the medical
community about whether alcoholism constitutes a disease.226 There was
also disagreement about whether alcoholism truly strips a person of his or her
ability to control the amount of alcohol consumed.227 As the plurality
reasoned:
It is one thing to say that if a man is deprived of alcohol his hands will begin
to shake, he will suffer agonizing pains and ultimately he will have
hallucinations; it is quite another to say that a man has a “compulsion” to
drink, but that he also retains a certain amount of “free will” with which to
resist.228

Turning to the question of what precisely Texas sought to regulate, the
plurality contrasted the facts in Powell with the facts in Robinson. Unlike in
Robinson, the State of Texas was not punishing Mr. Powell for being a
chronic alcoholic.229 Rather, Texas was punishing him for the act of being

221. See id. at 536–37.
222. See id. at 522–23.
223. See id.
224. Id. at 533.
225. Id. at 536.
226. See id. at 522 (“One of the principal works in this field states that the major difficulty
in articulating a ‘disease concept of alcoholism’ is that ‘alcoholism has too many definitions
and disease has practically none.’”).
227. See id. at 525.
228. Id. at 526. It is also worth noting that the Court went into great detail about the state
of scientific understanding about alcohol addiction at the time of Powell. The Court ultimately
concluded that the available scientific evidence was far from incontrovertible regarding
whether alcohol addiction could effectively eliminate free will. See id. at 526–31.
229. See id. at 532.
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in public while drunk.230 This distinction, though seemingly minute, was
constitutionally significant. The plurality reasoned that Texas sought to
regulate Powell’s behavior as opposed to his status.231 This act—being
intoxicated in public—could create a serious health and safety hazard both
for Mr. Powell and for the public.232 Accordingly, the state had the power to
criminalize it, even if the statute disproportionately affected those less
capable of regulating such behavior themselves.233 In reaching this
conclusion, the plurality rejected Powell’s claim that Robinson stood for the
broader proposition that “criminal penalties may not be inflicted upon a
person for being in a condition he is powerless to change.”234 The plurality
worried that to adopt such a broad position would render the Supreme Court
“under the aegis of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, the ultimate
arbiter of the standards of criminal responsibility.”235 If the Eighth
Amendment could bar prosecution of an alcoholic for being drunk in public,
could it bar prosecution of an addict for possessing drugs or committing a
theft to buy drugs? Would the broad reading Mr. Powell urged bar the
prosecution for murder of someone with an “exceedingly strong” impulse to
kill?236
The plurality even compared Mr. Powell’s argument to an attempt to craft
a sort of “insanity test” under the Eighth Amendment.237 The opinion stated:
If a person in the “condition” of being a chronic alcoholic cannot be
criminally punished as a constitutional matter for being drunk in public, it
would seem to follow that a person who contends that . . . “his unlawful act
was the product of mental disease or mental defect,” [under the so-called
Durham test for legal insanity] would state an issue of constitutional
dimension with regard to his criminal responsibility had he been tried under
some different and perhaps lesser standard . . . .238

In other words, the plurality found it difficult to distinguish between Mr.
Powell’s proposed extension of Robinson and an effective
constitutionalization of the Durham test for legal insanity.239 Given this
ambiguity, these Justices opted against taking a step that would hamper state
autonomy to define and limit criminal responsibility.240 Ultimately, the
230. Id.
231. See id. at 533.
232. See id. at 532 (clarifying that the punishment of an act that poses a public safety risk
is different from punishing someone for, as the Robinson Court described, being “mentally ill,
or a leper” (quoting Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962))).
233. See id.
234. Id. at 533.
235. Id.
236. See id. at 535–36.
237. See id. at 536 (“Nothing could be less fruitful than for this Court to be impelled into
defining some sort of insanity test in constitutional terms.”).
238. Id. (quoting Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1954), overruled
by United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (1972)).
239. See Durham, 214 F.2d at 874–76.
240. Powell, 392 U.S. at 536–37 (explaining in part that “formulating a constitutional rule
would reduce, if not eliminate, that fruitful experimentation, and freeze the developing
productive dialogue between law and psychiatry into a rigid constitutional mold”).
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plurality opinion appeared to strictly differentiate status and conduct.241
Even under the most generous interpretation, Mr. Powell’s public
intoxication was classified as conduct rather than as a status—and so the State
of Texas was well within its rights under the Eighth Amendment to punish
Mr. Powell.
The dissenting Justices argued for an expansion of the Eighth Amendment
to protect against the criminalization of conduct that an individual is
powerless to avoid.242 To these four Justices, the Constitution prohibited
states from punishing a person for conduct that was “a characteristic part of
the pattern of [a] disease [that is] not the consequence of [his] volition.”243
In the end, faced with a four-Justice plurality and a four-Justice dissent,
the separate concurrence of the ninth member of the Court set the boundaries
of the holding.244 Justice Byron White, concurring in the result, rejected the
distinction between status and conduct, instead focusing on the voluntariness
of Mr. Powell’s conduct.245 He wrote:
If it cannot be a crime to have an irresistible compulsion to use narcotics, I
do not see how it can constitutionally be a crime to yield to such a
compulsion. Punishing an addict for using drugs convicts for addiction
under a different name. Distinguishing between the two crimes is like
forbidding criminal conviction for being sick with flu or epilepsy but
permitting punishment for running a fever or having a convulsion.246

It may very well be the case, Justice White reasoned, that a chronic
alcoholic could become so drunk in private that he would “lose[] the power
to control his movements and for that reason appear[] in public.”247 Justice
White concluded the Eighth Amendment would forbid punishment in such
circumstances.248 But the record in Powell did not provide enough evidence
to reach such a conclusion.249 Powell had been convicted not merely of use
or possession of alcohol but for the separate act of being drunk in public, and
so Justice White upheld the conviction as constitutionally sound.250
241. See id. at 234–35.
242. See id. at 567 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 558.
244. See id. at 548 (White, J., concurring).
245. See id. at 548–52 (explaining in part how, for some alcoholics, it may be that
drunkenness is a symptom of their disease that they could have a hard time avoiding and so it
is simultaneously conduct and part of status).
246. Id. at 548 (citation omitted).
247. Id. at 552.
248. See id.
249. Id. at 552–53.
250. See id. (explaining how Powell could have drunk at home and made plans while he
was sober to prevent ending up in a public place). Justice White also observed a number of
other potential problems with Mr. Powell’s argument in the record. Id. The medical testimony
did not seem to indicate that Mr. Powell was unable to comprehend or control his behavior
because of his intoxication. Id. at 553–54. It may have been that Mr. Powell fully understood
his actions at the time he appeared in public drunk. Mr. Powell himself testified that he had
no clear recollection of the situation. Id. In the record, Mr. Powell had only really shown that
he was drunk at the time of his arrest and that he was somewhat compelled to drink because
of his infliction. Id. What he failed to do is show that he was incapable of staying off the
streets that night. Id.
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In its wake, the Powell decision left an uncertain constitutional line around
the criminalization of status. At least one commentator concluded that the
Court in Powell “relegated [Robinson] to the outermost fringe of the criminal
law by the narrow reading placed upon it.”251 Others are less certain.252
Between the plurality opinion, the dissent, and Justice White’s concurrence,
it is difficult to delineate a definitive rule from Powell. To be certain, Powell
does not appear to overrule Robinson.253 It does appear, however, to
significantly narrow the Robinson doctrine. Taken together, the two cases
seem to confirm the constitutional requirement that criminal laws must
regulate some conduct by the defendant, with Justice White requiring that
such conduct be voluntary.254 But the legacies of Powell and Robinson are
more complex. Just as Robinson prohibited criminalization of status, the
dissent and White’s concurrence in Powell would seem to suggest that some
conduct is so linked to status itself that it may not be constitutionally
criminalized. To paraphrase Justice White, it is the fever to the crime of flu.
This recognition of conduct entwined with status pushes against the
plurality’s concern in Powell that overextension of the Robinson status
doctrine could eviscerate the notion of criminal responsibility. As lower
courts have struggled to disentangle questions of conduct and status, the
complexity of this debate is ever apparent.
B. Extending Status Crimes to Inextricably Linked Conduct
The story of status crimes in the years following the decisions in Robinson
and Powell has been largely one-sided as courts have increasingly declined
to find statutes regulating conduct unconstitutional, even when the regulated
conduct is closely linked to status.255 The use of the Robinson doctrine has
been so limited that some scholars lament the lost opportunity to expand the
constitutional limitations on criminal punishment.256 Others, however, have
251. Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 1269, 1270 (1998).
252. See, e.g., Sarah Gerry, Jones v. City of Los Angeles: A Moral Response to One City’s
Attempt to Criminalize, Rather Than Confront, Its Homelessness Crisis, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 239, 245 (2007).
253. See DRESSLER, supra note 197, at 99.
254. See Kent Greenawalt, “Uncontrollable” Actions and the Eighth Amendment:
Implications of Powell v. Texas, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 927, 931 (1969) (“[T]he dissent comes
closer to stating the principles accepted by a majority of the Court [in Powell] than does the
plurality opinion.”).
255. See, e.g., Joyce v. City & County of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 845–46 (N.D.
Cal. 1994) (declining to find an Eighth Amendment violation for targeted enforcement of laws,
directed at conduct “arguably [] committed predominately by the homeless”); State v. Margo,
191 A.2d 43, 44–45 (N.J. 1963) (per curiam) (upholding New Jersey statute criminalizing use
of narcotics as distinct from criminalizing the status of narcotic addict).
256. See, e.g., Bilionis, supra note 251, at 1270 (“[W]hat followed from Lambert and
Robinson, the received wisdom holds, is a story of unfulfilled potential, the unexciting tale of
an exciting substantive constitutional criminal law that never came to be.”); Richard S. Frase,
The Warren Court’s Missed Opportunities in Substantive Criminal Law, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 75, 78–79 (2005) (concluding that, after Powell, the Robinson doctrine appeared merely to
stand for the proposition that states cannot punish “pure status or propensity” and that it does
not appear to impose “a constitutionalized ‘voluntary act’ standard”).
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argued that extending Robinson could pose a “radical threat to traditional
criminal law doctrine” so serious that it could “threaten[] the continued
existence of the criminal law itself” by eviscerating traditional notions of
responsibility.257 Given the lack of a clear holding in Powell, lower courts
have used different tests when examining whether a statute constitutes the
criminalization of status in violation of the Eighth Amendment. In large part,
they have concluded that state regulations—even those that appear linked to
status itself—are permissible under the Eighth Amendment so long as they
restrict conduct as opposed to status.258
Efforts to draw a strict dichotomy between the criminalization of status
and the criminalization of voluntary conduct have focused on the language
of the Powell plurality. For example, in Lehr v. City of Sacramento,259 a
group of eleven homeless persons and three nonprofit charities brought a civil
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Sacramento and the police
in the hope of enjoining the enforcement of the city’s ordinance barring
camping within city limits.260 As the plaintiff’s expert testified at trial, the
majority of the homeless individuals in Sacramento “have neither a legal
257. Martin R. Gardner, Rethinking Robinson v. California in the Wake of Jones v. Los
Angeles: Avoiding the “Demise of the Criminal Law” by Attending to “Punishment,” 98 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 429 (2008). In recent years, homeless litigants have invoked
this line of cases to challenge “laws that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct—such as
sleeping, eating, and urinating—[that is] . . . often innocent, life-sustaining, and/or reflexive.”
Weisberg, supra note 192, at 330. Scholars have also argued that a range of punishments
violate the Eighth Amendment’s bar on status crimes. For example, scholars and advocates
have attempted to apply the logic from Robinson and Powell to a number of other contexts,
including laws that criminalize drug addiction, laws that punish the homeless for engaging in
life-preserving acts in public spaces, and laws that punish loitering. See, e.g., Joel D. Berg,
The Troubled Constitutionality of Antigang Loitering Laws, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 461, 483–
84 (1963) (discussing how loitering can be considered a status crime); Mary Boatright, Jones
v. City of Los Angeles: In Search of a Judicial Test of Anti-Homeless Ordinances, 25 L. &
INEQ. 515, 515–16 (2007) (discussing the application of the Robinson doctrine to the context
of statutes criminalizing unavoidable behavior by the homeless and the Ninth Circuit’s
application of Robinson in such contexts); Victoria R. Coombs, Status Versus Conduct:
Constitutional Jurisprudence Meets Prejudice in Steffan v. Perry, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 593,
613–20 (arguing that the punishment and pressed resignation of a military member for being
gay constitutes an effective punishment for a status); Dawn Marie Korver, The
Constitutionality of Punishing Pregnant Substance Abusers Under Drug Trafficking Laws:
The Criminalization of Bodily Function, 32 B.C. L. REV. 629, 633–34 (1991) (arguing against
the criminalization of drug use in pregnant women); Tiffany Lyttle, Stop the Injustice: A
Protest Against the Unconstitutional Punishment of Pregnant Drug-Addicted Women, 9
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 781, 783 (2006) (same); Harry Simon, Towns Without Pity: A
Constitutional and Historical Analysis of Official Efforts to Drive Homeless Persons from
American Cities, 66 TUL. L. REV. 631, 660–64 (1992) (walking through the Court’s opinions
in Robinson and Powell before arguing that communities that do not provide the homeless
with alternative shelter options provide them with no voluntary choice but to break the law);
Edward J. Walters, No Way Out: Eighth Amendment Protection for Do-or-Die Acts of the
Homeless, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1619, 1632–33 (1995) (arguing that the Eighth Amendment after
Robinson prevents states from punishing the status of being homeless by criminalizing acts
homeless individuals cannot avoid like sleeping in public spaces). But see Herbert Fingarette,
Addiction and Criminal Responsibility, 84 YALE L.J. 413, 443–44 (1975) (arguing that actions
taken by addicts are not involuntary).
258. See infra notes 269–75 and accompanying text.
259. 624 F. Supp. 2d. 1218 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
260. See id. at 1219–20.
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place to go nor sufficient resources to obtain one.”261 Homelessness, the
expert contended, is due to factors outside of the individuals’ control, like
poverty, social isolation, and disability.262 Evidence also suggested that
Sacramento was unable to provide accommodations for homeless people,
leaving approximately 1200 persons on the street nightly without access to
shelters.263 Therefore, the plaintiffs in Lehr alleged that the city’s
enforcement of the anticamping law constituted a violation of the Eighth
Amendment as it effectively criminalized the status of being homeless by
expressly criminalizing an involuntary act by potential defendants—sleeping
in the only location available to them.264
In rejecting this argument, the Lehr court relied primarily on the plurality
opinion in Powell.265 While the city was able to establish that homelessness
constituted a serious problem, the court held that “this does not give us
license to expand the narrow limits that, in a ‘rare type of case,’ the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment places on substantive
criminal law.”266 Echoing some legal commentators, the court in Lehr also
emphasized that any ruling preventing Sacramento from enforcing such an
anticamping law under the Eighth Amendment would have “extraordinary”
ramifications for the criminal law more broadly.267 “A decision in Plaintiff’s
favor,” the court warned, “would set precedent for an onslaught of challenges
to criminal convictions by those who seek to rely on the involuntariness of
their actions.”268
Similarly, courts have opted not to extend the Robinson doctrine to drug
possession offenses,269 possession with intent to distribute drugs,270 child
pornography distribution,271 and illegal reentry into the United States after
deportation.272 In each case, the courts not only noted that the statutes in
question regulated conduct as opposed to status, but they also rejected the
notion that such conduct was beyond the defendant’s control or constituted a
necessity of life itself.

261. Id. at 1222.
262. See id.
263. See id. The City of Sacramento housed approximately 1500 individuals at emergency
shelters but the number of beds provided was simply inadequate for the number of individuals
on the streets every night. See id.
264. See id. at 1224–27.
265. Id. at 1229 (identifying the disagreement between the Justices in Powell and ultimately
relying on the plurality as “sound logic”).
266. Id. at 1231 (quoting Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1138–39 (9th Cir.
2006) (Rymer, J. dissenting), vacated after settlement, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007)).
267. Id. at 1232.
268. Id. at 1234.
269. See, e.g., United States v. Ritter, 752 F.2d 435, 438 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that the logic from Robinson does not
prevent the state from punishing possession of narcotics by a drug addict).
270. See, e.g., United States v. Kidder, 869 F.2d 1328, 1332 (9th Cir. 1989).
271. See, e.g., United States v. Black, 116 F.3d 198, 201 (7th Cir. 1997) (declining to
extend Robinson to distribution of child pornography by a stipulated pedophile or ephebophile
absent evidence that the act of distribution was linked to disease and involuntary).
272. See, e.g., United States v. Ayala, 35 F.3d 423, 425–26 (9th Cir. 1994).
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By contrast, other courts have interpreted the Powell and Robinson line of
cases to provide a more significant Eighth Amendment limitation on
criminalization.273 These courts have held that states cannot constitutionally
punish conduct that is so inextricably linked to one’s status as to render its
regulation indistinguishable from the punishment of status itself. These
courts have examined the criminalized conduct in relation to the status
claimed. The most prominent of these cases is Jones v. City of Los
Angeles.274 Similar to the Lehr case, the plaintiffs in Jones were a group of
homeless individuals seeking to enjoin a Los Angeles ordinance that
criminalized actions like sitting, lying, or sleeping on public sidewalks.275
As expected, the Jones court began its Eighth Amendment analysis by
discussing Robinson and Powell.276 After walking through the history of
these cases, the Jones court ultimately concluded that “five Justices in Powell
understood Robinson to stand for the proposition that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits the state from punishing an involuntary act or condition if it is the
unavoidable consequence of one’s status or being.”277 The court also
concluded that the articulation of this understanding by the Powell dissenters
and Justice White in his concurrence was not mere dicta but rather was a
point of agreement that had garnered the requisite five votes to be binding.278
In applying this interpretation of Powell and Robinson to the facts at hand,
Jones made two important findings. First, the court observed the
fundamental unfairness of penalizing individuals for engaging in conduct that
is necessary to sustain life.279 The acts that the Los Angeles ordinance
criminalized—sitting, lying, and sleeping—are “unavoidable consequences
of being human.”280 A person is “biologically compelled” to engage in this

273. See, e.g., Farber v. Rochford, 407 F. Supp. 529, 534 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (overturning a
loitering statute as a status crime); State v. Adams, 91 So.3d 724, 751 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010)
(holding that Robinson and Powell together “stand for the proposition that the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment forbids punishing criminally not only
a person’s pure status, but also a person’s involuntary conduct that is inseparable from that
person’s status”).
274. 444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated by settlement, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007).
275. See id. at 1120–23.
276. See id. at 1132–35 (discussing in detail the history of Robinson and Powell and
emphasizing that the majority of Justices in Powell supported some finding that involuntary
actions could constitute status offenses).
277. Id. at 1135; see also Robert L. Minser, The New Attempt Laws: Unsuspected Threat
to the Fourth Amendment, 33 STAN. L. REV. 201, 219 (1981) (“[T]he consensus [of the
majority of Justices in Powell] was that an involuntary act does not suffice for criminal
liability.”).
278. Jones, 444 F.3d at 1135 (citing United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 915, 914–16
(9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., concurring)).
279. See id. at 1136.
280. Id. (“It is undisputed that, for homeless individuals in Skid Row who have no access
to private spaces, these acts can only be done in public.”). Soon after this quote, the majority
admonishes the dissenters for suggesting that a homeless person could simply avoid sleeping,
lying, or sitting in public: “The City and the dissent apparently believe that Appellants can
avoid sitting, lying, and sleeping for days, weeks, or months at a time to comply with the City’s
ordinance, as if human beings could remain in perpetual motion.” Id.
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conduct.281 It would be unreasonable to expect individuals not to engage in
otherwise innocent and necessary conduct.
Second, and relatedly, the court held that the life-sustaining conduct
criminalized under certain circumstances in the Los Angeles ordinance was
inextricably linked to the status of being homeless.282 Even if Los Angeles
sought to criminalize “acts” and not status, given the lack of available
housing, homeless individuals had no real voluntary choice—they must
either break the law or cease to exist. Their bodies required sleep, and
alternative accommodations were not available.283 To survive, the homeless
of Los Angeles would eventually be compelled to break the law.284 Thus,
the court concluded that the Los Angeles statute amounted to “criminalizing
Appellants’ status as homeless individuals.”285
In the context of bathroom laws, it is also worth noting that the judges in
Jones included language about the meaning of status under the Eighth
Amendment. The Ninth Circuit noted that “[h]omelessness is not an innate
or immutable characteristic, nor is it a disease, such as drug addiction or
alcoholism.”286 Individuals may escape homelessness only to become
homeless again in the future.287 Nonetheless, the court held that a statute
need not criminalize an immutable characteristic to run afoul of the Eighth
Amendment.288 It need only create a situation where an individual, because
of her current condition, must choose between existence and lawfulness.
The Jones court’s recognition of acts linked to status is not unique. In
other contexts, at least one Supreme Court Justice previously flirted with the
idea that acts “so closely linked” to the status of being LGBTQ may be
protected under the Robinson doctrine.289 Subsequently, at least one court
has relied on the Robinson doctrine in suggesting that states cannot
criminalize the status of being gay or lesbian.290
Likewise, Jones’s acknowledgment that the criminalization of transient
status may offend the Eighth Amendment is not unique. For juvenile
offenders, the Supreme Court has held that offenses such as truancy, curfew
violation, or unruliness that depend on the offender’s status as a minor must
281. Id.
282. See id. at 1137.
283. See id. at 1121–23.
284. See id. at 1135–36.
285. Id. at 1137.
286. Id.
287. See id.
288. See id.
289. For example, in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), where the majority upheld a state’s ban on sodomy, Justice Lewis
Powell’s clerks “felt that the act of sodomy was so closely linked to the status of homosexuality
that perhaps Robinson could be stretched to protect both from criminal prosecution.” Marc S.
Spindelman, Reorienting Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 N.C. L. REV. 359, 408 n.151 (2001)
(quoting JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 520–27 (1994)). Justice Powell
initially accepted this theory on Robinson but later abandoned it in favor of a disproportionality
theory of the case. See id.
290. See, e.g., Cyr v. Walls, 439 F. Supp. 697, 701–02 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (“[A] statute
criminalizing [gay or lesbian] status and prescribing punishment therefore would be invalid.”
(citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962))).
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be treated differently than other criminal (or in the terms of juvenile court,
delinquency) offenses.291 While this distinction is premised on the notion
that the conduct in question is inseparably tied to the defendant’s status as a
child—youth is in fact an element of the offenses in question—in many ways
it is a distinction that serves to deny greater protections, because children
adjudged to have committed status offenses may be held without a due
process precommitment hearing.292 Even so, the Court has recognized that,
in limited cases, even a transient status such as youth requires shelter from
criminalization under the Eighth Amendment.
In other contexts, however, states have been left free to criminalize
behavior that is dependent on youthful status. So called “juvenile status”
offenses, such as “minor in possession of alcohol” or “minor in possession of
a firearm,” survive constitutional muster despite the fact that the act of the
defendant is criminal only because of her status as a minor.293
The story of status offenses is a mixed and often neglected history with
courts struggling to define the precise parameters and protections of the
Eighth Amendment as set forth in Powell and Robinson. Despite this
muddled history, there is at least some willingness to recognize that
criminalization of conduct so closely linked to status may support Eighth
Amendment challenges under Robinson and Powell. Admittedly, the
category of conduct that is inextricably linked to status is narrow. Courts
seem inclined to rely on this doctrine only in rare cases. But as explained in
the next subpart, the context of bathroom laws may be one of the few
circumstances that warrant the extension of this doctrine to a new category
of criminal statutes.
C. Applying Robinson to Bathroom Laws
This Article contends that, should states pass laws that attempt to
criminalize the use of bathrooms by trans individuals consistent with their
gender identities (either as a stand-alone crime or a violation of existing
statutes), such a law could constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Read together, the Court’s decisions in Robinson and Powell seem to suggest
that while states may criminally regulate conduct linked to status, they may
not criminally regulate conduct that is so entwined with the defendant’s
291. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 620–21 (1979).
292. See id. (holding due process protections did not extend to minors held on status offense
in treatment and reform facilities). The Court reasoned that because such status offenses
carried a rehabilitative component, they did not require an adversarial process or other
protections associated with the adult criminal court. Id. The Court suggested that had the
adjudication implicated a “punishment,” the offenses might have run afoul of the Eighth
Amendment. See id.
293. See Hannah Frank, Unambiguous Deterrence: Ambiguity Attitudes in the Juvenile
Justice System and the Case for a Right to Counsel During Intake Proceedings, 70 VAND. L.
REV. 709, 726 (2017) (noting that police often use status offenses to justify the arrest and
detention of youthful offenders who are engaged in conduct that would be legal if they were
adults); Franklin E. Zimring, Toward a Jurisprudence of Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & JUST.
477, 498–99 (1998) (discussing the status offense of minor in possession of a firearm and
noting that if the offender had been an adult, the possession would not have been a crime).
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existence as to have the effect of criminalizing her or his status. To be sure,
the category of conduct so tightly linked to existence is small, but given the
biological imperative of bathroom use, regulation of such use based on trans
status would appear to effectively criminalize the “status” of being trans.294
Given the serious consequences of criminalization—both in terms of official
and vigilante enforcement—this recognition of bathroom regulation as status
regulation would offer private civil rights advocates a narrow avenue through
which to challenge the constitutionality of certain categories of bathroom
laws.
The argument proceeds as follows: First, using a bathroom is a necessary
biological function without which human existence fails.295 Second, existing
laws prohibit the public exercise of this function outside designated
spaces.296 Third, as a result of their status as living human beings, trans
individuals have no genuine, voluntary choice when in public but to use
public bathroom facilities when needing to exercise biological functions.
Fourth, bathroom regulations that prohibit a trans person from using a
bathroom facility consistent with their gender identity create a Hobson’s
choice for trans individuals. If they obey the law and use a bathroom
consistent with their “biological sex” as assigned at birth, they put themselves
in serious risk of humiliation, embarrassment, and physical violence—
particularly if their outward physical appearance is more in line with their
gender identity. If they use the bathroom facility consistent with their gender
identity, they violate the law. In short, because such laws are targeted
specifically at trans individuals, and they criminalize conduct linked to
existence, they criminalize the very existence of such individuals.
Even if one adopts the position of the Powell concurrence that states may
seek to regulate conduct linked to a status that produces social harm, there is
no evidence that bathroom use by trans individuals actually produces such
harm. Despite the loud and hyperbolic claims to the contrary,297 experts have
widely discredited the argument that the use of bathrooms by trans
individuals consistent with their gender identities poses any safety risk.298
294. Courts need not recognize the trans community as a protected class of any kind to
protect trans individuals from status crimes. This Article does not take a position as to this
issue.
295. To quote the popular children’s series, “All living things eat, so [e]veryone [p]oops.”
TARŌ GOMI, EVERYONE POOPS 25–27 (1993) (confirming that all living creatures, including
humans, poop).
296. A simple Westlaw search reveals a wide array of statutes and regulations prohibiting
public urination and defecation outside of designated bathroom facilities. The authors
conducted a Westlaw search on July 22, 2017, using terms “urinat! /10 public.”
297. See supra note 86 and accompanying text; see also Jeff Brady, When a Transgender
Person Uses a Public Bathroom, Who Is at Risk?, NPR (May 15, 2016),
http://www.npr.org/2016/05/15/477954537/when-a-transgender-person-uses-a-publicbathroom-who-is-at-risk [https://perma.cc/ZQY7-HJPA] (describing various claims of danger
by proponents of bathroom bills).
298. See Brynn Tannehill, Debunking Bathroom Myths, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 28,
2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brynn-tannehill/debunking-bathroom-myths_b_8670
438.html [https://perma.cc/BD4J-G93X] (noting studies by medical and law enforcement
professionals all concluding that trans use of gender identity bathrooms does not increase
predation or harm).
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Thus, bathroom laws are generally distinguishable from the overwhelming
majority of criminal statutes in that they punish conduct that, for all practical
purposes, is harmless. In other criminal law contexts, the Supreme Court has
barred states from criminalizing harmless conduct.299
As seductively compact and efficient as the argument above may appear,
there is more at play than the mere regulation of where an individual may
perform particular biological functions. Bathroom regulations for trans
individuals, like the criminal regulation of addicts and the homeless, seek to
draw boundaries around spaces of existence.
Proponents of the bathroom bills decry the potential risk to women and
children posed by trans individuals using bathroom facilities consistent with
their gender identities.300 These same proponents argue that they do not seek
to ban trans bathroom use altogether—rather, private bathrooms exist that
trans individuals may use just as there are private spaces in which trans
individuals can exist.301 They argue that bathroom regulations are less about
criminalizing the status of being trans and more about criminalizing the
conduct of bathroom use and the social harm that may flow from that use.302
That argument is tenuous at best and destructive at worst. At its core, the
argument seeks to preclude the physical presence of trans individuals in
public settings by regulating their bodily functions. It seeks to carve out only
the narrowest spaces in which trans individuals can live and function as
citizens and people. It seeks to exclude them from the public spaces that
people share in a communal recognition of what it is to be a human being. In
the process, it seeks to relegate the status of being trans to the status of being
other, foreign, and subject to regulation. Ultimately, this argument leads to
exclusion, criminalization, and concealment.
In sum, bathroom bills that propose the criminalization of trans bathroom
use may run afoul of the Eighth Amendment by criminalizing seemingly
involuntary, harmless, and life-sustaining conduct inextricably linked to the
status of being trans. While courts have been reluctant to extend the
Robinson and Powell doctrine to many criminal law contexts, bathroom bills
present a unique situation—one in which the majority has targeted a criminal
prohibition at generally innocent conduct only in cases where it is inevitably
committed by a disadvantaged minority. In the larger scheme, though, such
bathroom bills signal the further marginalization of the trans population.
While the Constitution may not explicitly recognize a right of human dignity,
such recognition seems implicit in the Court’s prohibition of the
criminalization of status. However limited the Robinson holding may be after
Powell, at a minimum it stands for the notion that criminal law cannot and
should not outlaw people.

299. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (striking down a Texas
statute that prohibited consensual sexual activity between adults).
300. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
301. See generally Wilson, supra note 86.
302. See generally id.
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D. Possible Objections
Critics may have many legitimate reasons for concern about this Article’s
proposal to treat bathroom laws as status regulations. This section seeks to
recognize and address such objections. First, and most obviously, such
statutes arguably regulate conduct as opposed to status per se. As such, they
could survive a constitutional challenge under Powell.
Such a
characterization, however, overlooks both the involuntary nature of the
conduct regulated and the cobbled holding of Powell. The need to use the
bathroom, including at times public bathrooms, is a necessary biological
function arguably no more avoidable than breathing in public. It is innocent
conduct criminalized only because of status—that of being a trans individual.
Second, some may argue that being trans does not comport with the more
traditional understanding of status under the Eighth Amendment. To bolster
this argument, critics may contend that trans individuals ultimately make a
choice to identify as a gender different from their so-called “biological sex”
assigned at birth. Under this rationale, critics may argue that trans individuals
are not barred from using public bathrooms under many proposed bathroom
laws. They are merely required to use a bathroom consistent with their
“biological sex.” If trans individuals are worried about the possibility of
humiliation, violence, or other backlash, they could simply abstain from
using public, sex-segregated bathroom facilities.
The notion of trans status as “transitory” is hardly new to the Eighth
Amendment debate on the criminalization of status. The dissent in Jones
argued that being homeless was not the kind of status typically protected from
criminalization under the Eighth Amendment, as it can be a “transitory state”
that “can change.”303 Likewise, the Powell plurality questioned the
sufficiency of the permanence of alcoholism to establish it as a status.304
In the context of trans status, however, the primary argument of the
transitory nature of trans identity misunderstands the lived experience of a
trans person and the nature of status crime prohibitions under the Eighth
Amendment. For one thing, while the decision to live consistently with one’s
gender identity may technically represent a choice of sorts, emerging
scientific evidence calls into question whether the status of being trans is in
fact a choice or a biological phenomenon.305 Beyond this, the fact that the
303. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2006) (Rymer, J., dissenting),
vacated after settlement, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007).
304. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 523–25 (1968).
305. See Samantha Allen, What Science Can Tell Us About Trans People’s Brains—and
What It Cannot, DAILY BEAST (Jan. 19, 2017), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/
2017/01/19/what-science-can-tell-us-about-trans-people-s-brains-and-what-it-cannot.html
[https://perma.cc/5YGJ-PSLM] (discussing emerging scientific evidence surrounding a
genetic or neurobiological basis for trans status); Leslie P. Henderson, Check the Science:
Being Trans Is Not a ‘Choice,’ OZY (Feb. 25, 2017), http://www.ozy.com/pov/check-thescience-being-trans-is-not-a-choice/69726 [https://perma.cc/BR7V-F34V] (same); Francine
Russo, Is There Something Unique About the Transgender Brain, SCI. AM. MIND (Jan. 1,
2016),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/is-there-something-unique-about-thetransgender-brain/ [https://perma.cc/Y36Q-TV6B] (same). But see Bradford Richardson,
Born Gay or Transgender: Little Evidence to Support Innate Trait, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 24,
2016),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/aug/24/born-gay-transgender-lacks-
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status may be transitory does not preclude it from Eighth Amendment
protection.
The Court in Parham v. J.R.306 noted the inherently temporary nature of
youth.307 The Jones court acknowledged that homelessness might not be
constant.308 Each court confronted with an admittedly transitory status
nonetheless found Eighth Amendment fault in criminalization of that status.
In each opinion, the constitutional offense arises from the criminalization of
the status itself as opposed to the permanence of the status. Neither Powell
nor Robinson suggests that courts must view the concept of status so
narrowly.
Next, critics may claim that even if faced with a choice between
criminalization or humiliation (or worse) when using public bathrooms, trans
individuals can make a choice to use either private, single-occupancy, or
gender-neutral bathrooms. This critique suffers practical flaws, however. It
is premised on the notion that trans individuals have access to such facilities
at the moment of need.309 As nearly any traveler can attest, the need for a
bathroom and the presence of a bathroom do not always neatly align.
Likewise, not all public buildings or accommodations offer single-occupancy
bathrooms.310 A careful examination of the bathroom laws proposed during
the last four years reveals that virtually none of them require public buildings
to provide trans persons with such an accommodation.
Critics may also contend that criminal law defenses of justification or
necessity are available to trans populations charged with violation of
bathroom regulations or other criminal statutes, and, as such, no
constitutional claim is necessary. In Powell, Justice Marshall noted that
“[t]he doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, insanity, mistake, justification, and
duress have historically provided the tools for a constantly shifting
adjustment of the tension between the evolving aims of criminal law and
changing religious, moral, philosophical, and medical views of the nature of
man.”311 Indeed, such defenses—particularly justification or necessity—
may provide some shelter for trans individuals arrested and charged for
violating a bathroom statute. A justification defense permits a necessary and
proportional response to triggering conditions.312 Likewise, a necessity

science-evidence/ [https://perma.cc/6FG7-PH6B] (noting that the question of whether or not
trans status is biological is still open for debate).
306. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
307. Id. at 602–03.
308. Jones, 444 F.3d at 1137.
309. See Jody L. Herman, Gendered Restrooms and Minority Stress: The Public
Regulation of Gender and Its Impact on Transgender People’s Lives, 19 J. PUB. MGMT. & SOC.
POL’Y 65, 65–66 (2013) (documenting the level of harassment trans individuals reported when
forced to use bathrooms inconsistent with their gender identity and the widespread lack of
gender neutral bathrooms).
310. See id.
311. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536 (1968) (plurality opinion).
312. See Paul Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 199, 216 (1982) (describing justification defenses).
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defense allows noncompliance with the law if the harm resulting from
compliance is greater than that resulting from violation.313
Each of these defenses are available to trans individuals confronted with
the choice of risking harm or arrest when performing the necessary life
function of using a bathroom in public. The availability of such defenses,
however, does not undo or solve the constitutional deficiency that arises from
the criminalization of trans status. Nor does the availability of the defense
offer shelter from the humiliation and personal costs associated with arrest,
trial, or the possibility of conviction if the fact finder concludes that the
defense is unpersuasive.
Finally, critics may contend that interpreting the criminalizing effect of
bathroom bills as a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s bar on status crimes
will open the door for challenges to a wide range of other criminal statutes.
This is the same fundamental argument made by the plurality in Powell and
the court in Lehr. Such a fear, however, seems unfounded.
There is little reason to believe that an extension of the Robinson doctrine
to this context would lead to any sort of slippery slope. Bathroom laws
present a unique situation of a state outlawing conduct—the use of bathroom
facilities consistent with a person’s gender identity—only when committed
by trans individuals. This conduct is, for all practical purposes, necessary
and life sustaining. This raises concerns about the voluntariness of the
conduct criminalized by proposed bathroom laws and also suggests that the
category of conduct that the state criminalizes under bathroom laws is
decidedly narrow. It is conceivable that a court could find that the unique
character of bathroom laws runs afoul of Robinson by effectively outlawing
involuntary conduct that is inextricably linked to the status of being trans
without putting other criminal statutes at risk.
Both Robinson and Powell recognized that there would be times when
constitutional protection is required to prevent the criminalization of status.
The reluctance to find the need for such protection in Powell seemed to stem
from the lack of evidence on the voluntary nature of the conduct in question
and its link to the status alleged rather than a belief that status cannot or
should not be protected from criminalization.
CONCLUSION
It does not appear that bathroom bills are going away. The Trump
administration has already removed the federal guidance that protected the
ability of trans children to use the bathroom facilities consistent with their
gender identity in public schools. In the absence of such executive leadership
on this issue, there is a greater need than ever for civil rights advocates to
help turn the tide. As more states and localities consider bathroom laws,
researchers must be prepared to evaluate the long-term implications of these
measures in a way that could sway state legislatures. The academic
community must be prepared to evaluate the most audacious claims made by
313. WAYNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.4(a) (3d ed. 2000).
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supporters of these laws. Advocates must be armed with concrete data on the
likely costs and consequences of bathroom legislation.
Should these measures become law in some states, scholars must be ready
to offer concrete, empirical evidence about the implications of these
measures. Future research could empirically evaluate the preparedness of
police to enforce such bathroom laws or qualitatively assess the impact of
these measures on the well-being of the trans community.
For the time being, though, it is important to recognize that many of these
bathroom proposals do more than merely stigmatize trans individuals. These
measures are not just symbolic. As discussed in this Article, recent proposals
would effectively criminalize public bathroom use by trans individuals.
Criminalization comes with serious consequences. It exposes the trans
community to the risk of physical and emotional harm as members of the
community come into more regular contact with criminal justice actors. As
shown in this Article, actors in the criminal justice system appear to be
unprepared to handle this newfound responsibility. Criminalization is not
just bad public policy—it may very well be unconstitutional. By
criminalizing otherwise innocent, life-sustaining, and arguably involuntary
conduct so inextricably linked to the status of being trans, some bathroom
laws run afoul of the Eighth Amendment. This may provide advocates with
a narrow but important avenue through which to challenge the
constitutionality of certain categories of bathroom laws.

